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Abstract
This study attempts to explore the alteration of historical narratives on centennial
anniversary according to existent political situations in the South Caucasus. Drawing on
the literature developed by several scholars of the politics of memory and
commemoration, the thesis argues that coupled with national memory and cultural
memory, political memory lead historical narratives to be impacted by states’ actions.
What is more, national/collective memory, national/collective identity and political
interest are interdependent, whereas foreign policy derives from the political interest.
All things considered, the theoretical background brings to the conclusion of the
possibility of narratives to be shaped by political situations. The thesis aims to dig into
narratives provided and make a comparison with historical narratives to find out altered
(highlighted or concealed) narratives. The research uses narrative analysis as a
technique of qualitative method. Primarily based on chosen state-run media materials,
as well as other primary sources of three countries of the region, narratives are being
studied here for the first time. Some of the contributors here are celebratory speeches of
countries’ officials and conducted elite-interviews of local experts from Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The results show that all three countries shift their historical
narratives owing to the political situation existent.
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1Introduction
Every nation is idiosyncratic in its own way. This uniqueness derives from the peculiar
path of the community in the form of history, identity, collective/national memory,
national consciousness and other characteristics constructing an image of the Self. In
order to preserve already founded, but still malleable collective/national memory, States
by political tools (re)construct, record, discard and make specific events remembered
using the politics of memory and mnemonic practices. It includes commemoration days
and anniversaries, holidays within the national calendar, school textbooks and distinct
institutions of memory collectivization. It is significant as well to acknowledge that
commemoration and remembrance can simultaneously serve as a legitimization of
power, ideology promotion or States’ current foreign and domestic policy orientation.
On May 2018 Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia marked the 100th anniversary of the
establishment of independent republics in the South Caucasus, back in 1918. Following
political situation and disintegration within the Russian Empire during the end of the
First World War, these entities declared their independence. Over this time, newly
established states either tackled with challenges towards (regional) powers or develop
gradually bilateral relations with the latter. This thesis maps out to draw apparent
parallels between mutual relationship of states during First Republic and those
nowadays. Specifically, major powers as Russia, Turkey, Britain are observed coupled
with less important, but still influential actors. Moreover, the dissertation sheds light on
bilateral relation in between three countries of the region.
Although these republics were short-lived as sovereign states, their impact on current
republics’ collective identities and collective memories are noticeably high. For a long
time, countries of the region were unable to mark this date due to the restrictions
imposed by the Soviet Union. The latter did its best for obliterating the First Republic
from the national consciousness and instilled silence. With the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and restoration of independence, three states gradually began to recover the
heritage of the First Republics. Nevertheless, the acts of commemoration have not been
marked annually, and some of the countries still were reluctant in their memory
decisions. Depending on a political situation and political regime in power, the attitude
2towards the First Republic varied from one country to another as well as from one
particular period to the other.
Throughout of the past year, three countries marked the anniversary on a large scale,
hosting more than hundred of events within and outside of countries along with internal
movements and military parades in different parts of the republics. Armenia
symbolically celebrated the day of the occasion at the Sardarapat Memorial which
stands at the top of Armenian narrative on centenary anniversary, emphasizing the
military victory in Sardarapat, Bash-aparan and Gharakilisa coupled with the
genocide/massacre1 in the role of independence establishment. In Azerbaijan similarly
wide-range movements were held in Istiglaliyyat street symbolized the Azerbaijan
Democratic Republic and official visit has been made to the monument erected in its
honour. Furthermore, the small-scale military parade took place therein. At the Freedom
Square in downtown Tbilisi a show-force military parade has been displayed with
symbolical oath-taking process. Moreover, the historical reenactment of the
proclamation of independence has been illustrated in Tbilisi. More important, the
occasion has been performed at the National Youth and Children’s palace and at the
same local time when the independence had been announced. Commemorations have
been accompanied by a number of academic conferences in three South Caucasian
countries with numerous publications devoted to the occasion.
The centennial anniversary became an important platform for South Caucasian states to
promote their images internationally and strengthen memory politics domestically.
Applying a set of concepts on the politics of memory and commemoration, this thesis
focuses mainly on international aspect, but will touch upon domestic aspect as well. The
latter involves how states using memory politics display themselves on international
arena. For instance, both Azerbaijan and Georgia use westernization of the politics of
memory, highlighting the democratic values and credentials of the First Republic.
Countries also make a bridge between the values founded and their current political
orientation as a successor of founding fathers. Hereby, Georgia foregrounds the
importance of the constitution, the first democratically elected woman and being
1 In order to maintain objectivity and avoid expressions which do not concern the field of my expertise
both terms massacre and genocide would be used in this thesis.
3historically European. Azerbaijan accentuates on then-newly established first secular
and democratic state in the Turkic/Muslim world and gender equality, giving women
same right to vote as men.
People are usually aware of these basic facts and witnesses of commemoration rituals
and anniversaries, nonetheless having superficial knowledge on the process
implementation in-depth. People generally remain uninformed on how and why States
produce particular narratives about events sticking on some, hiding the others and what
are the motives behind this. The novelty of this dissertation project, thus, lies on
engaging in the recent centenary anniversary took place in the South Caucasus that is
new and have not been explored before. What is more, the dissertation employs
comparative few case study, covering all three countries of the region. The focus of the
thesis will be given on the alteration of the historical narratives according to political
circumstances, at the same time touching upon incentives of doing so and
commemoration patterns. Thus, my research question based on this context is following
How were the historical narratives about centenary anniversaries in the South Caucasus
shaped by the contemporary political situations? My primary expectation is that
narratives circulated by state-run media outlets as well as in the speeches of the official
figures carry on the interest (political or national) and follow the (foreign) policy
orientation of chosen states.
Yet, in particular no study has yielded on the centennial anniversary in the South
Caucasus, analyzing the narratives of all three countries. In a sequel, the references will
be based on previous studies examining the politics of memory and commemoration in
other events and countries’ experiences. The importance of the work lies in a possibility
to understand the region profoundly. More important, their attitude towards the First
Republic gives a message on their identity, perception of Self and Other. For instance,
analyzing the narratives can provide an overview on how states see the future of the
country, how states are going to construct collective memory and try to predict the near
future actions in bilateral relations. Furthermore, through the narratives for both
international and domestic audience, the state implicitly insinuate certain content.
4The objective of this thesis is to analyse the alteration of historical narratives as related
to political situations within each of these three countries. Therefore, it is my intention,
first, to pick historical narratives on centenary anniversaries from the state-run online
media outlets. Second, to compare them with the historical narratives proposed by local
historians. Third, to relate the mainstream political celebration discourses with the
dominant political agendas in each South Caucasian countries. Finally, to observe
parallels in historical narratives by state-run media and the state’s policy orientation in
order to find out how actually were historical narratives shaped.
The thesis is based upon a few case comparative studies of most similar systems design
in three countries of the South Caucasus. Qualitative research through the narrative
analysis would be employed step by step according to Bal’s narrative analysis strategy.
Timeframe for picking the narratives is going to contain date of anniversary in given
countries and one month (May) prior to the usual strategy of governments to spread
specific narratives beforehand. Because Azerbaijan had two additional events (military
parades) related to the centennial anniversary, the narratives from both of them would
be examined later. The main data consists of three parts: speeches of governmental
officials, narratives from three state-controlled online media outlets for each of the
countries (and additionally, Armenian diaspora) separately, and interviews with local
practitioners, scholars and experts.
By and large, thesis comprise the table of contents, introduction, four chapters,
findings/conclusion, appendix and bibliography. Here, the first chapter consists of
theoretical framework, while revealing the prominent theoretical concepts which
expected to be built in the form of chain. More precise, I will opt for the concepts
through which I would be able to account for the outcome reached in the conclusion.
The second accounts for the research design and methodology used. The third gives
background information on the analogies from local historians. The fourth chapter will
immerse into analysis of each country and answer posed research question, being
concluded with the conclusion section. Finally, the finding and concluding remarks
coupled with appendix and bibliography are given in the end of this dissertation.
51. Theoretical Framework
In recent years the literary on memory has been grown sharply. In this chapter, some of
the main concepts indispensable for understanding the operation of the politics of
memory and commemoration as well as how political agendas and priorities can
influence the shape of historical narratives will be briefly sketched. More precise, in the
first sub-chapter the necessary forms of memory facilitating a clear overview on the
topic will be described. Switching to national master narratives, their peculiar role in
states and nation-building process to be scrutinized; and how all these are fortified by
national commemoration and remembrance. The second sub-chapter accounts for
identity and memory politics; the interdependence of national collective memory and
national identity with the political interest. Finally, in the last sub-chapter the ways of
celebration the occasions by local media as ‘public historians’ to be explained.
1.1. The notion of memory, national master narrative and commemoration
Memory serves as a linkage between remembering and forgetting, thus building a
framework of the past commonly shared by a particular community. Simultaneously, it
is what contains the prominent part of nation-building process via specific tools and
mechanisms masterminded by national elites. There is no one single historical or
collective memory within a community, but rather diverse narratives and feelings about
the past, which reflects the variety of political or social interest groups striving for
power. Through national master narratives, elites create particular collective/national
memory which has undergone the filtering of remembering or forgetting. This
constructed collective memory embeds the past, the present and the future of a social
group forming its national identity. However, both collective/national memory, national
identity and narratives are fluid and changeable depending on circumstances or political
needs. In that case, commemorations have been always successful in fortifying these
memories. Thus, being an inherent part of commemoration, anniversaries function as an
assistant for events to survive and remain alive.
6Collective memory is a socially constructed notion, based on knowledge that is shared
among members of a social group. Memory can be altered over time, involving its
signifiers such as shared history, memories, power and collective consciousness
[Durkheim’s conscience collective] (Durkheim 1893/1997; Halbwachs 1992: 38).
Altogether they trigger solidarity within a group and form its identity. Maurice
Halbwachs connected to the concept of social frame pointing out that “No memory is
possible outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve
their recollections” (Halbwachs 1992: 43). Shared concerns of people, their values,
experiences and narratives are parts of implicit or explicit construction that is called a
social frame. Keeping the track of Halbwachs, Assmann continues that the life of
human beings in fact lasts not only in the first person singular, but also in plural where
are going to be involved in groups and accepting communities’ “We” (Assmann 2008:
51). Moreover, shared experiences and discourses that build precise boundaries
construct actually this “We” with defining “the principles of inclusion and exclusion”
(Ibid, 52). Assmann adds that “the individual participates in the group’s vision of its
past by means of cognitive learning and emotional acts of identification and
commemoration” and pre-mentioned past actually cannot be remembered, but it ought
to be memorized (Assmann 2008: 52). For Halbwachs, memory is interconnected to
how minds of people work together in society: “it is in society that people normally
acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize and localize their
memories” (Halbwachs 1992: 38). Binding this with the topic of this research, a
commemoration of the First Republic in the South Caucasus, the event of which took
place back in 1918 and have not been witnessed by anyone individually, is a memory
acquired in society and boosting solidarity and identity construction.
Nevertheless, neither institutions nor groups are capable to enshrine a memory as
individuals do. To put it another way, rather than having a memory deriving from the
neurological system, institutions and groups, involving nations, churches and leadership
constructs memories via specific mnemonic signs such as commemoration ceremonies,
texts, images, symbols, monuments, memorial places and rites. Therefore, such a
memory serves as a springboard for both institutions and groups to build a particular
identity (Assmann 2006). Furthermore, on the basis of selection and exclusion a
7memory can be sorted out by a split of relevant and irrelevant memories. This is why
collective memory is also considered as a mediated memory upheld by the
media-promoted, symbols and practices immersing into people’s minds, consciousness
and hearts. At the same time, their effectiveness depends on political factors on the one
hand, and ethnic patriotism and fervor from the other. However, for a more
comprehensive picture, I will opt for narrowly proposed by Assmann concepts of
cultural, political and national memory which do not discard the concept of collective
memory, but differentiate them as distinct modi memorandi, ways of remembering .
According to Assmann, cultural memory is a form of collective memory due to the fact
of being shared by a community and “that it conveys to these people a collective, that is,
cultural, identity” (Assmann 2008: 110). Here, external objects play role either on the
level of personal memory or on social memory. Besides constant interaction, there are
also ambient symbols that lead to the existence of collective memory. Jan Assmann
clarifies:
With respect to things such as Marcel Proust’s famous madeleine, or artifacts,
objects, anniversaries, feasts, icons, symbols, or landscapes, the term “memory” is
not a metaphor but a metonym based on material contact between a remembering
mind and a reminding object (Assmann 2008: 110).
Even if they do not possess their own memory, they boost ours via particular naratives,
images and stories, commemorations, rites and texts. Same is more significant on the
social level for those social groups which do not have memory (or complete, memory)
and which are going to build one using commemorative dates and practices, monuments,
mnemonic institutions, ceremonies, museums, libraries and archives that would carry on
their memories. Altogether comprises a form of collective memory, as outlined, cultural
memory. This concept specifically suits the case of the South Caucasian countries, the
independent statehood of which is considerably young and memory of which are still
under construction.
8The concept of political memory is a type of memory backed up and constructed with
political purposes (by political agents or institutions). That includes the construction of
identity via specific memorial signs such as texts, monuments, ceremonies, images,
myths and rituals. Meanwhile, a narrative that has emotional tone is noteworthy in
making political memory. For its successful implementation, one narrative should have
a thrust, demonstrating the significance of the nation and strengthen its self-image;
emphasizing mostly achieved goals, triumphs and victories, while hiding failures
(defeats) which do not fit into the heroic image of the nation. Jan Assmann in her work
Trasnformations between history and memory gives an insight into top-down political
memory being scrutinized by scholars engaged in political studies who analyses the role
of memory for the formation and promotion of ideology, building such a collective
identity usable for political actions (Assmann 2006: 56). Nevertheless, it should be
taken into account that even if memory agents are creators of memories, they
themselves are affected by memories formed within society. Thus, they may alter of
focuses and meaning, but cannot create absolutely new collective memory (Aguilar,
Humlebaek 2002). The similarity between political memory and cultural memory is
being reproduced from one generation to another, making collective memory transferred
as well (Assmann 2008: 56).
As stated by Gedi, national memory is the spirit and the psyche of the nation (Gedi 1996:
35). Originally national memory comes from and is a part of political memory,
distinguished by its unique shared experiences, culture and remembrances of the
national past. Both remembering and forgetting in national memories are prompted by
certain political incentives for strengthening national identity. National memory is
defined by Confino as “constituted by different, often opposing, memories that, in spite
of their rivalries, construct common denominators that overcome on the symbolic level
real social and political differences to create an imagined community”, where he meant
that an explanation of what national memory is flew from what they both forget and
remember (Confino 2017: 183). Thus, national memory is constitutive for the
nation-building process, where national collective memories has been used for
mobilization, inventing a more distant past with founding myths (Muller 2002: 9).
9Muller also clarifies that collective or national memory establishes “a social framework
through which nationally conscious individuals can organise their history” outlining that
it also could hardly be appropriate to dub this memory a form of myth (Muller 2004: 3).
Because, according to him, national/collective memory and national identity are
mutually constitutive. At last, national/collective memory simultaneously can shape and
conflict with individual memories. For scrutinizing the function of national memory in
bilateral relations, Heiko Paabo underlines two levels: consciousness and
unconsciousness use of collective memory. He identifies conscious use of memory
happening “when the national elite consciously uses the symbols of the past to
legitimate their policy or strengthen their support among masses” (Paabo 2011: 63).
Here, Paabo determines unconsciousness use of memory based on beliefs constructed
by national memory. Unconsciousness use of national memory in the state’s foreign
policy, according to Berger is a segment of political culture, coming up with specific
foreign policy issues and decision-making (Berger 2002: 81).
In Bal’s understanding, narrative is found in a text where an agent or narrator tells a
peculiar story in a medium (1985/1997: 5). A chronological sequence of events inferred
from the text is, in other words, a story, whereas the plot, which has beginnings, middle
and ends, portrays a path of how the event of past is narrated. As such, in order to
successfully reach its goal, narratives should comprise “interesting storyline and
impressive heroes” (Misztal 2003: 10). “Storytelling transforms private meaning to
public meaning” writes political theorist Hannah Arendt and narrator is key factor due
to what story he/she is telling, because this narrative and people who listen are actually
“where the power lies” (Jackson 2002: 36). By the same token, national master
narratives are inevitable where they tell unique stories of the nation, unifying a group
through history even if some interpretations do not reflect the real circumstances
(Zerubavel 2011: 238). One may see that national narratives and national identity are
inseparably connected, where one builds another providing with uniqueness of the
group and defining its “Others”. National narratives, as Heisler puts it, “tell itself about
itself, indicate and form its self-image - its collective identity or sense of collective self”
(Heisler 2008: 203). The affirmation of national narratives being a basis of national
memory comes from the fact that citizens having their own national consciousness
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accept this national narrative. These national narratives that are shared commonly based
on national consciousness will show up their reflections in media, education,
commemorations and rituals with society carrying the same narratives.
Classic conceptualization of commemorations is unpacked by Durkheim:
commemorations serve to “sustain the vitality of a social group’s beliefs, to keep them
from being effaced from memory, and … to revivify the most essential elements of the
collective consciousness” (Durkheim 1915: 420). It is what is interlinked with the
identity and memory historically: “Identities and memories are not things we think
about, but things we think with” (Gillis 1996: 5). Acts of commemoration fulfil two
main goals as first, to remind and facilitate a group self-awareness on their identity and
second, to give a moral importance to the events. Gillis elaborates this thought pointing
out that the acts of commemoration from its roots are “social and political, for it
involves the coordination of individual and group memories, whose results may appear
consensual when they are in fact the product of processes of intense contest, struggle,
and, in some instances, annihilation” (Ibid, 5).
Every single act of commemoration replicates a commemorative narrative (Zerubavel
2011: 237). As such, commemorative narratives maintain a story which reflects a
nation’s idiosyncratic past expounding the process of ritualized remembrance which
alarms members of one group with a clear moral message. Commemorations influence
the segments of the past. They structure an existent collective memory because
commemorations are conducive to a master commemorative narrative formation.
Ensuing from collective memory which highlights an idiosyncratic identity of a group,
national master narratives analyze the events that demarcate the emergence of a group
as a self-sufficient social entity and order preconceived relations towards other nations
(Ibid, 238). However, what is necessary apart of commemoration is the participation of
people in the acts of commemoration as its imminent part. Casey specifically makes
detailed review where the outlines that this participation “occurs via the mediating
presence of various commemorabilia, material or psychical; we remember through these
translucent media; but we could just as well say that we participate with them in
honoring a common commemorandum” (Casey 2011: 184). There also other people we
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participate with which he calls “horizontal” and commemorator who makes possible the
commemorandum proper. Commemoration did not separate us for our differences, in
turn, it unifies us as a strictly social being, rather than individual. Thus, acts of
commemorations gather those who intertwined, not who merely go to commemorate out
of guilt, recurrence or fellow feeling. Here, even commemorators are intensely bonded
at the most profound stage.
The sites of memory are identified by Zerubavel, Accordingly, “Libraries,
bibliographies, folk legends, photo albums, and television archives … history textbooks,
calendars, eulogies, guest books, tombstones, war memorials, and various Halls of
Fame. Equally evocative in this regard are pageants, commemorative parades,
anniversaries, and various public exhibits of archaeological and other historical objects”
(Zerubavel 2003: 6). The politics of memory makes it clear that the acts of
commemorations are much more important than merely symbolic rituals for awareness
of the past. The state’s role in the process is asserted by Hite, where commemoration is
inevitable - it “aided by a loyal citizenry, to doing the re-memory work of structuring a
nation, of shoring up nationalism and patriotism in order to build the state stability and
represent state in a non-violent, even glorious way” (Hite 2013: 4). Thereby, the process
of memorization reshapes the perceived meaning of the past with an ability to mobilize
(and depending on political infrastructure to influence the future). Anniversary
commemoration, like other types of commemorations, works as, dubbed by Etzioni,
“seeds of virtue” (Etzioni 2011). The process of anniversary commemoration cause to
memorize and fortify shared beliefs that are formed within society and increase the
sense of togetherness. The formal explanation of the concept of the anniversary is given
by Kitch, for whom the anniversary “a ritual celebration of the community who
observes it, serving to strengthen its identity and values through the remembrance of an
event” (Kitch 2002: 48). Complementing this thought, such commemorations foster
what is called “emotional energy” intensifying mnemonic depiction of past events and
“respect for symbolic objects” (Collins 2004: 67).
However, anniversaries do not contain only a symbolic object, but also foundational
myths and selective discourses of the past. All of these narratives have to be strongly
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associated with both the nation itself and the political regime, maintaining a balance
between two. Unlike historical science, myths do not reflect what has actually happened,
in spite of myths being a historical narrative. Myths have the ideological function to
“promise us ‘a conclusion’ to the community’s narrative identity in the form of a future
utopian horizon” (Kolvra 2015: 74). They serve as a narrator of emergence, foundation
and beginning of the nation’s road (or in this case the road its independence). Political
myths that are widely used in centenary anniversaries replicate the origin of the
community, the events related to the foundation and co-existence. The infinite
grounding principles, characteristics, and features of one society are posed in the
narrative of origin. In memory studies, politically instrumental national narratives are
often discerned as national myths, hence national memory and a national myth. As
stated by Snyder, through the national myths that national memory comprises, it is
easier for the nationally conscious individual to comprehend the past and present
(Snyder 2002: 50). Nonetheless, Gildea separates narratives set out as myth from other
stories from the narratives that have historical ground and rebuild history due to the
current political infrastructure. Anyway, narratives that are a segment of the national
memory create a bridge between individuals of a group and outside world.
1.2. Memory and identity politics: Interconnection between collective/national
memory and policy orientation
In this sub-chapter, I am trying to scrutinize the role of identity and memory politics and
their necessity in international relations and commemoration activities. I argue that all
three categories - national/collective memory, national identity, and political interest -
are deeply interconnected and dependent on each other as well as how thereof
commemorations are taking place. Ritualized days of commemorations are primarily
conveyed for remembering the prominent past events by individuals of a society or a
state. It can be either a traumatic event or, as in this case, a celebration. As it was
pointed out in the previous chapter, usually commemoration and commemoration
activities work for strengthening solidarity and the feeling of togetherness and trigger
social mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion. Commemoration days play a crucial role
for political actors through involving heads of the states and politicians and boosting
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national prestige either in the region with its neighbours or in the world (Onken 2007:
24).
Interaction between states, current relations, and their past experiences contribute much
on their identities. It also shaped the state of identity’s alteration and further
reconstruction. The vision of actors has a potential capability in influencing the
construction of the relations’ framework which consequently determines their identities.
Identity is usually explained as an expression of a group’s uniqueness and outlining
people’s belonging to one peculiar community. Put another way, identity is a
composition of practices, values, and ideals which have been built based on memories.
By memory here is meant a narrative telling us about the past, self-perception, what is
the truth and what is not. It creates a relationship between nation and positive or
negative experience, thus differentiating “Us” from “Other” and assists to put together
those who enter the same system of “Self”. Similarly to collective/national memory,
national identity is defined as a social representation, where a national group keeps on
not merely for itself, but also to other national groups.
The backbone of the national identity formation is laid on the group’s historical
transformation into a nation, where a nation’s identity is built up based on national
master narratives and collective memory. National collective memory is thus
interdependent with the national identity and facilitates national identity’s strengthening.
Reconsideration and reshape of collective memory occurs constantly the historical
occasions and benchmarks promulgated by a regulatory agency that alter the content of
national identity. Furthermore, identity is a legitimate existential backbone of a
nation-state. Thus, one of the main tasks of the state (or its political interest) is to
safeguard the national identity. Along with the linkage collective memory and national
identity with each other, they also interdependent with the political interest. As it has
been mentioned upper in the first sub-chapter, the state feels the necessity in creating
institutions of memory collectivization as mnemonic practices (textbooks, military
service, calendar and holidays, museums, monuments, specific theatres, etc). Because
for fortifying the collective memory process, one memory should be promoted,
discussed, scrutinized and invoked. To keep the existence of the nation, it is also
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important for the state to foster the real heroic people and their images, antiheroes,
narratives of victimhood, suffer and resistance. However, there are also
counter-memories within society, which oppose to the regime’s interests. A slight
difference between the interest of political force and national/state interest should be
pointed out. When the former concern only one political group, the national/state
interest involves all layers of society. Above-mentioned counter-memory can also be
transformed into the collective memory, but only when the regime’s interest reshaped
by the new regime. This process is well suits into the case of Georgia and how
commemoration practices and relation to the First Republic varied from one political
force into the other.
Furthermore, Snyder outlines that national memory is “a means of organizing the past
such as to preserve the dignity of the group with which we identify, and thus bolster our
prides as individual human beings” (Snyder 2002: 55). Likewise, the other factor that
should be taken into account is the national prestige. The goal of foreign policy is to
promote the country’s “historical truth”, facilitate its national prestige, victimization of
a nation and relations with other states in the international arena. National memory thus
influences mass mobilization and strong national identity, which in its turn handles with
symbols boosting national pride and prevents any kind of threats to the state’s
ontological security and national prestige.
Herewith, Social Constructivism devotes particular attention to the collective memory,
not merely as something that works for hard interests, but a segment that identifies these
interests (Wendt 1987: 355). Social Constructivism demonstrates the linkage between
the collective memory and identity as self-awareness of human agents not like being a
deliberation of interests, but as a component that is capable to shape and identify them.
Thus, the very past experiences do influence society’s and state’s perception of one
other country. Thus, sometimes negative collective memory that has formed within
society influences the political force in foreign policy choices. It can be exposed by the
case of Azerbaijan, the perception of Russia within society and its reflection on official
narratives on the centenary anniversary. Nevertheless, both collective memory and
political interest are interdependent, what means not only collective memory is capable
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to shape the political interest, but also being influenced, transfigured straightaway by
political interest. Furthermore, depending upon a political interest of the regime in
power, the collective memory and foreign policy can be altered, opposing sometimes,
thereby, the state’s national interest. Additionally, the memories which contravene the
national interest that involves existential threat, fragility of territorial integrity and
sovereignty (see Table 1).
Table 1: The interaction between national/collective memory, national/collective
identity and political/national interest, and the influence on the foreign policy.
National and/or
Collective identity
National and/or
collective memory
National and/or
political interest
The state’s foreign policy
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Identities account for “who or what actors are”, whereas interests imply “what actors
want” with demonstrating their motivations of behaviour. Wendt explains interests as
“presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it
is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests” (Wendt
1999: 231). Alexandre George and Robert Keohane delineate three categories of
national interest: physical survival or life, autonomy or liberty and economic or property
(George&Keohane 1980: 221-30). The first - physical survival as a state-society
complex is about territorial property and whether the state allow to surrender or
secession the property to preserve national interest. The second, autonomy or in other
words liberty includes state-society complex to have a supremacy over its resources and
government choice. Being deprived of liberty, the states would not be able to meet its
internal needs and external necessities. The third economic growth, due to Wendt, is a
sufficient “maintenance of the mode of production in a society and, by extension, the
state’s resource base” (Wendt 1999: 236).
Regardless numerous scholars reckoning the economic growth as the main interest of
the states, Wendt distinguish the fourth national interest dubbed “collective self-esteem”.
This is “a group’s need to feel good about itself, for respect or status” that hinge on
positive and negative collective self-images (Wendt 1999: 336-7). Collective
self-images are produced from the significant Other and how the state (Self) see itself in
relation to Other. As a consequence of perceived disrespect, distrust or scorn by the
Other, the negative self-image is to be emerged. On the contrary, mutual respect and
cooperation leads to the construction of the positive self-image (Wendt 1999: 336-7).
Memory is inevitable politically since political establishment can opt for it as an
instrument for the power and policy orientation. To gain support for their policies, they
usually draw historical analogies and refer to the crucial events within national memory
(Konig 2008: 27-33; Olick 2007: 122). Nora argues that national memory is “in
permanent evolution, a perpetually present phenomenon” and an ongoing process that
never stops to be constructed and reconstructed selectively (Nora 1989: 8). Due to the
constant flexibility and ambiguity of memories, they are able to be manipulated and
used as a tool for mobilization (Muller 2002: 21-2). Extensive use of memory politics to
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forge national identities has started in all South Caucasian countries immediately after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Simultaneously, memory has contained the main segment of the nation-building process
in the background of footprints remained from the previous regime. Defining their
policy orientation states set off to clarify their national memories. As Halfdanarson
states “States have created or fortified national sentiments through national school
systems, military service, national health service, symbolic actions, and the eradication
of regional cultures, inculcating the idea that all their citizens have something in
common” (Halfdanarson 2000: 22). Over time, an established national memory has
been shaping according to policy orientations and interests of political elites as well as
the national interest.
Another view on this issues comes from Eva-Clarita Onken who clarifies three main
levels of analysis of memory and politics: domestic policy, bilateral relations and
supranational level (Onken 2007: 26). In this thesis due to the limitations occurred the
main emphasis would be given particularly on the bilateral relations. Altogether these
concepts mentioned upper account for how and why political situations affect the
historical narratives Thus, with the provided theoretical framework and demonstration
of the main historical discourse that appeared right after the independence I will
scrutinize how the same historical narratives have been shaped in line with the
contemporary political situation in practice.
1.3. Journalism’s memory work: Anniversary journalism
For transmuting a short-term memory into long-term collective memory with a purposes
of it being maintained from generation to generation, it should be fleshed out in distinct
forms. Those are: a) creation of narrative that mobilizes with events emplotment; b)
verbal and visual signs that will keep up a memory; c) expanding of mass media and
specific institutions of learning; d) monuments and sites; e) commemoration rituals
sporadically reviving and reawakening memory and collective participation (Assmann
2008: 55-6). In case of anniversaries, it is important to reckon the expansion of the mass
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media which spread specific national narratives through the countries contributing to
nation-building process and last point of Assmann regarding commemorations rituals
being revived during anniversaries as well. Assmann thinks that commemoration
operates by permeating the past with its present meaning and it also serves to “restore
the mnemonic quality of historical knowledge, to bring it back to popular consciousness,
and to reconnect it with the realm of lived experience” (Corning, Schuman 2015: 191).
Anniversary journalism is a demonstration of the media’s role in collective memory and
collective memory’ role in journalism (Kitch 2000 :62). In that sense, state-run online
media outlets that have been chosen for analysis are particularly important taking into
account their national reach, the style of presented narrative, and as Kitch puts it “they
physical permanence make them important sites of meaning-making,
community-building, and reminiscence” (Kitch 2000 :45). For preserving the past,
therefore, one social group or journalists should retell the story of an important event
and constitutive narrative. The story that they come up with already contextualized the
past within the contemporary stage and present as well as future within a past,
producing a narrative course that involves national meaning (Kitch 2000: 48). Thereby,
in that context, anniversaries work out as a reminder of both journalists and audience of
being one part of this occasion in time and place, showing them the future. Likewise,
Barbie Zelizer underlines that “the study of collective memory . . . is much more than
the unidimensional study of the past. It represents a graphing of the past as it is used for
present aims, a vision in bold relief of the past as it is woven into the present and the
future” (Zelizer 1995). Media journalists use techniques of personalization and narrative,
especially highlighting an event or scene from the past. The journalists of state-run
media outlets spotlight the event primarily according to the state’s main agenda, policy
orientation, and advocate regime’s ideology. The study state-controlled media outlets
thus will open up an opportunity to observe the parallels occurred in policy orientation
and alterations in historical narratives.
As it was mentioned above, journalists who have reckoned also as public historians
select (or being directed to select) the events and people of the past, accounting for their
historical importance within a particular social group. In their job, they concentrate in
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present and fix their narratives accordingly with setting “their collective recollections
and reconstructions of the past in place by attending to their own agendas” (Zelizer
2008: 81). During anniversary commemorations, journalists as they do throughout
ceremonies and public speeches are provided with a “legitimate, culturally sensible peg”
(Schudson 1986: 103). Therefore, anniversary journalism updates reinforces and build a
“social cite of memory”, where the main goal is not to inform, but rather reiterate social
values and fortify collective identity (Nora 1989; Zerubavel 1996; Kitch 2000).
Consequently, one version of events is going to be reaching those who are not witnessed,
amplifying a certain social memory.
Furthermore, political elites sort out and choose selective discourses that cause and
strengthen social cohesion forging identities. These national master narratives are going
to be spread during the anniversaries via subsidiary means such as media (the main ones,
state-run media sources), fiction, depending on the case monuments erections, informal
digital space (Facebook groups, Twitter, Instagram where people share their solidarity).
By and large, these national narratives operate based on political myths (with heroic
intervention, founder fathers and so forth) which articulate during the period of
anniversaries (particularly centenary anniversaries). Nevertheless, one should be pointed
out, there are also unofficial actors that forge identities such as media personalities and
epistemic communities playing while constructing national memory (but, of course,
states or political leaders still preserve their primacy). Quite relevant example on state
spreading such narratives can be demonstrated by the case of Georgia. The government
of Georgia funded a project “Revive History” dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the
First Republic of Georgia. The main characters of the First Republic would have
portrayed with their personal stories, videos and pictures on Facebook. The pages
included full information on these characters and achievements of the First Republic of
Georgia (GPB 2018). First Channel also contributed in creation microfilms about heroes
of the First Republic, covering the historical figures such as the first female MPs and
others. For instance, one of them is Maro Makashvili died throughout the Soviet
invasion Georgian army nurse (Agenda 2018).
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2. Research Design and Methodology
By and large, this thesis will conduct a few case comparative case studies focusing on
how historical narratives on centenary anniversary were modified by political situations
in the context of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia). The key
criterion for the case selection was similar parallels occurred in the histories of the
countries. The independence of all three countries has been gained with the collapse of
the Russian Empire and two revolutions involved. Moreover, South Caucasian states
lost their short-lived independence accordingly with the takeover of the Soviet Union.
As Przeworski and Teune pointed out the MSSD is appropriated for engaging in area
studies which is specifically relevant here (1970:33). It poses a comparison of very
similar cases which have differences in their dependent variables (in this case historical
narratives) and will assist to find out those independent variables that, thus, accounts for
this dependent variable. The key criterion for the selection was having the similar
history (control variable) back in hundred years ago, taking also into account few other
common features. The central point here is that albeit of having the similar history, the
historical narratives vary from each other based on political situations what proves
selected for the thesis most similar system design.
The dissertation follows the logic of a narrative analysis of qualitative research using
Mieke Bal’s narrative analysis strategy. Before moving to the case studies, the
(historical) background information will be given. Thereby, the brief historical
background will facilitate further comparison of narratives and help to find out which
narratives underwent alterations. All data for the background information will be taken
from the local historians (Armenian for Armenia, Azerbaijani for Azerbaijan and
Georgian for Georgia) or foreign historians focused on this particular country. The
empirical grounding of the analysis is based primarily on narratives produced by the
state-run online media outlets as well as the congratulatory speeches of each president
(or prime-minister) and two conducted elite interviews with experts per country. The
data were gathered by sorting out and collecting stories from online media sources,
subsequently deducing one single narrative that the state reckons as a priority to allocate.
Due to time constraints, the attention will be paid to the news coverage of celebration
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on 26th of May for Georgia, and on the 28th of May for both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Timeframe for picking the narratives devoted to the anniversary is going to contain one
month (May) owing to the usual strategy of governments to spread specific narratives
beforehand. The attention will be paid also to how these states celebrated and what is
the role of the First Republics in people’s consciousness. Furthermore, as in case of
Azerbaijan two additional dates will be analyzed. Both of them closely related to the
centennial anniversary and comprise a part of the contemporary general narrative of
Azerbaijan. Any other information that is considered important in conducting the
research will be used.
Specifically, three government-controlled online media outlets are chosen for the
analysis: EVN report, Armtimes, Armenpress from (post-revolutionary) Armenia, Trend,
1news, Azertag from Azerbaijan, Agenda, GPB, Adjara from Georgia. The decision was
made based on the content of news of the media outlets, the information of the
ownership in the web-page and reports with the indicators from the Transparency
International. Taking into account the specificity of Armenia, its diaspora and the
situation which overlapped with the centenary anniversary three The Armenian weekly,
Asbarez, The Armenian mirror-spectator diaspora and three pro-government sources
Azg, Iravunk, Golos Armenii serving the previous regime have been opted for. Hansen’s
set of criteria is followed for selecting online media outlets, including being a formal
authority, clearly articulated and widely read (Hansen 2006). Albeit distinct influential
factors (mass media, NGOs, civil society and academia), the state or political regime
still keeps its precedence in accession collective/national memory formation, while
being in power. That was the main reason for me picking concretely those online media
sources that are funded by states themselves.
Then, the celebratory speeches of presidents (or prime-minister) are scrutinized and
would be incorporated into the single narrative derived from the analysis. The selection
of the speeches are also followed the same criteria given by Hansen. The first figures of
the state have significant capacity in shaping people’s perception. Most probably, the
narratives shared by the authorities will circulate in the chosen online media sources. An
analysis would be fortified by elite interviews to get a local perspective and what can be
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missed during the study. To see clear-cut patterns of narrative elements, all interviews
have been particularly conducted in a written form to examine narratological
specificities in depth.
2.1 Qualitative narrative analysis as a technique
The dissertation offers an overview of the narrative analysis of inquiry, an approach that
concentrates on the use of stories as the foremost data. The strategy I am going to use in
analyzing this data is originated from Mieke Bal’s method of examination. News is
deeply rooted in the existent tradition of storytelling (Lule 2002a). Narratives are “the
primary way by which human experience is made meaningful” and what arrange the
world of ours (Polkinghorne 1988: 1). Grand narratives, on the other hand, sort out
which meanings are appropriate or in other words rational meaningful and which are, on
the contrary, irrational and pointless. The given approach utilizes the instruments taken
from narratology and literary analysis to figure out resemblance in structure. Although
there are a number of definitions of narratives mostly from the literary perspective, Bal
identifies the notion of narrative that widely fits alternative fields as well:
A narrative text is a text in which an agent or subject conveys to an addressee
(‘tells’ the reader) a story in a particular medium, such as language, imagery,
sounds, buildings, or a combination thereof. A story is the content of that text,
and produces a particular manifestation, inflection, and ‘colouring’ of a fabula;
the fabula is presented in a certain manner. A fabula is a series of logically and
chronologically related events that are caused or experienced by actors (Bal
2009: 5).
According to Bal, various general statements and weakly narratives assist us in
formulating, making comparison and contrast diverse interpretations. It means that not
only “purely” narrative statements and text, but also any texts that have narrative
elements are eligible to work with. Bal categorizes three layers of analysis, including
fabula (content), text (medium) and story (presentation). Fabula account for the sequence
of events, actions and actors that formulates appropriate narrative. The story is content of
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text narrated, the angle and the zest added to it. The text is a framework of signs and
symbols that serves for the presentation of the narrative. As a whole, all layers facilitate a
comprehensive picture and gives a detailed overview of components of the text analyzed.
As I have chosen a considerable number of narrative texts and texts that have narrative
elements within, I would not probe all of them separately, but rather will extract,
compare and find out the single narrative the state maps out to be conceived. Engaging in
the text or Bal’s meaning of the narrative, the selected texts would be analyzed by means
of imagery, sounds and language signs (Wibben 2011: 47). Then, switching to the story
of fabula, I will analyze parts of the narratives such as focalization and focalizors,
ordering processes, frequency, and repetition as well as ellipsis (Bal 1997: 6; Wibben
2011: 47-8). Lately, the content of the narrative or fabula which as Wibben points out
serves as a plot having the beginning, the middle and the end would be scrutinized
(Wibben 2011). Despite the fact that Bal does not use the plot as a part of her strategy,
all three countries’ narratives would be reviewed from this perspective as well. In
general, plot implies a sequence of events within a story where other events are
influenced by the structure of cause and effect.
One of the main components of the narrative analysis is the agent of the textual layer or
to put it differently, a narrator which presents itself via the language comprising the text.
Equally important are the ordering principles of in which form the events are getting
presented with changing their chronological order between past, present, and future by
moving back and forth (Wibben 2011: 48). Here, frequency and repetition adds features
of the significance of the reiterated events and alludes to its “correct” meaning.
Simultaneously, the general presentation of events has its own “vision” (or a point of
view) from which the narrative is presented. Being referred as a focalization, it often
shaped the meaning of the fabula. The terms focalization is derived from the
photography and film, implying the relations between the elements presented and the
vision through which they are presented” (Bal 2009: 145-6). The point is that, even if the
ideology or a perspective is not directly expressed, we could reconstruct it from a
narrative structure.
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Using news, which are often narrative, and they have a specific structure, or, rather
different structures: in the case of news and other media reports it is often important how,
in which order the events are presented - i.e. the plot is more important than the fabula,
but it could be compared with the fabula to see which events are prioritized and
foregrounded and which backgrounded. For instance, while doing the media narrative
analysis, a classical structure of the news “inverted pyramids” should be taken into
consideration. Accordingly, first, the most urgent or newsworthy events are presented
(who did what, when, where and why). Then the report focuses more narrowly on details.
Finally, background info is presented. This approach is necessary because not all chosen
online media contain fully-fledged narratives, but rather news with narrative elements.
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3. Background information
A little earlier before independence, three states of the South Caucasus for quite a long
time have been included in a Russian Empire. The unstable situation within the Russian
Empire and two revolutions opened up a path for the creation of a new Council in
Tbilisi, known as Transcaucasian Seim. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and Trabzon peace
conference as well as disagreements within, have led Seim to establish Transcaucasian
Democratic Federative Republic that started to function on April, 1918. Due to the
contradictions and clashes of national interests, the Republic of Transcaucasia has soon
broken up. Consequently, on 26th of May Georgians declared their independence, and
right after, on 28th of May the same has been done by Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
However, unlike others, Armenia was reluctant to leave the protection of Russia and
continue to coexist independently with the enemy (Turkey) and two “unreliable”
neighbours (Kurkjian 2008). Simon Vratsian adds that Turkey - the winner of the
situation urged Armenians to proclaim the independence as a prerequisite to further
peace. Meanwhile, the political forces under the leadership varied from country to
country. In Armenia, the nationalist but also socialist-leaning Armenian Federation of
Dashnaktsutyun was dominated. The power in Georgia was concentrated in the hands of
the Menshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic workers’ party. In Azerbaijan,
the control was asserted by the Turkist national forces preponderated in Azerbaijan’s
Musavat Party.
With Aram Manukian as a founding father and prime-minister Hovhannes Kajaznuni,
First Republic of Armenia declared itself as an independent, self-governing state and
plenipotentiary power. The constitution of the republic gave suffrage to all citizens who
were above twenty years old. The first national elections took place on June 1919 and
80 members could pass into the Armenian Parliament. According to Armenians, it was
the crucial achievement to establish the republic after the massacre/genocide Armenians
faced a couple of years earlier. The new Georgian state was established by the
leadership of Noe Ramishvili - the head of the government and the minister of internal
affairs. Janelidze writes that Georgia did not follow the Soviet model, but rather went
for “a democratic way of development that separated the legislative, executive, and
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legal power from one another” (Janelidze 2018: 171). The Georgian Democratic
Republic managed to publish the republic’s first constitution in February 1921.
According to him, constitution of Georgia was also based on the model used by Western
countries and giving rights to women, ethnic and religious minorities. Another
achievement is an active role of women in Georgian politics. Thus, the Constituent
Assembly comprised of 130 members five of which were women. Identical to Georgian
historiography, Azerbaijani discourse considers western values as fundamental
principles of the established statehood. Almost all discourses within Azerbaijani
historiography outlines the importance of ADR as the first democratic republic with the
parliamentary model of management in both Turko-Muslim and Oriental world. Shaffer
states that “In almost all movements they joined, the Azerbaijanis continued to be at the
forefront of Muslims advocating the adoption of liberal values and enlightenment. One
example of this is the insistence on the emancipation of women advocated by political
parties in both north and south Azerbaijan”. Thus, Azerbaijan under the leadership of
M.E.Rasulzade was among those states who granted women the right to vote and equal
political rights to women and men, along with the secularity came from Azerbaijani
intelligentsia.
Later, all three countries determined their own path and allies according to the existent
situation. Georgia went for the alliance with Germans which is logically understandable
since at that moment only Germans could pose a counterbalance against Ottomans.
Armenians pursued assistance from Russia on one hand, and France and Britain from
the other. In turn, Azerbaijanis sought Turkish support and its eagerness to collaborate
at the root was related to the harsh relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan and
massacre against Azerbaijanis in Baku. At that time, Baku was multiethnic and it was
the only place in the Caucasus where the Mensheviks did not dominate, and rather
Bolsheviks took the main control over. Under the leadership of Baku Bolsheviks run by
Stepan Shaumian, the situation was even messier. The native population was completely
excluded from the power: no places were given to the representatives of Musavat or
Hummat therein. Simultaneously, the gradually growing strength of Musavat party
among workers and peasants set off to frighten the socialist forces.
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Paradoxically enough, but before independence the interests of Bolsheviks and Musavat
for the short period of time overlapped, involving the consensus over the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk. However, forthwith concentration of all power under the Bolsheviks run
by Shaumian aggravated the relationship with Musavat. The deterioration has led to the
ethnic tensions between Musavat party, the Armenian Federation of Dashnaktsutyun
and Baku Soviet. The struggle was going over the Transcaucasia’s largest city, where,
as Kazimzadeh puts it, Bolsheviks tried to use one people [Musavat and ARF] against
each other. In March 1918, Soviets disarmed Azerbaijani crew of a ship dubbed Evelina,
via which officers were transported from Lankaran to the funeral in Baku. Cornell notes
that Musavat has asked for help from Dashnaksutyun, but the latter declared its
neutrality, and then unexpectedly joined the Bolsheviks at night of March 31. Fighting
continued in several Azerbaijani cities and regions, including Baku which further
outgrown into a massacre of Azerbaijani people (which is one of the central narratives
in contemporary Azerbaijani discourse, mainly referred as a genocide).
The first state with whom Democratic Republic of Georgia has built international
relations was Germany. In the discourse of Georgia, Germany is prescribed as a
protector and guarantor of independence. On May 1918 two sides reached an agreement
on the military, economic and trade issues. However, the central role has been in the
protection of Georgia against Turkey. On June Turkey entered the south of the country
and Germany was one who stood against together with Georgians. Accordingly, the
image of Turkey in Georgian historical discourse is shown as an occupant and enemy.
The treaty of Batum was perceived as unacceptable with the only positive aspect of
Turkey recognizing Georgia as an independent state. Janelidze exemplifies the
occupation with the promise of the Turkish government to help Georgia against Red
Army which turned into unexpected consequence “the Turks occupied Batumi. Muslim
Georgia was declared part of Turkey” (Janelidze 2018: 181).
Unlike Georgians, Armenian historians outline the help of the British to the newly
established government. Thereby, with the assistance of Britain Armenia could have
captured some territories in May 1919. Moreover, the British made a contribution in
opening the road between Tiflis and Yerevan thereafter. Armenian National Council did
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not recognize the treaty of Batum between Armenians and Turks, consequently joining
Bolsheviks in capturing Baku. However, with the Russian withdrawing forces from
there, the Council asked for the British help, which was refused. Opposed to Armenia,
certain ambiguity existed in the relationship between ADR and Britain. Although the
early period continued turbulently for the obvious reasons since general William
Thomson with its military units entered the Caucasus the situation has slightly changed.
Azerbaijan accepted the British forces on its territory with the provision to not let White
Russians to the city. Initially, the National Government did not want to agree on that
because it would put in question the sovereignty of the state. Afterwards, Thomson
supported democratic credentials, assisted in balancing the order in Baku and was
willing to recognize the government.
In Armenia, the image of Turks is portrayed negatively. Armenian history describes
Turks as the main threat to the existence of the Armenian Republic before and during
the independent period. The friendship treaty cropped up between Russia and Turkey in
January 1918 and the overall rapprochement between those two, as Kurkjian puts it,
became “disastrous” for Armenia. In a sequence, clashes between Armenia and Turkey
dragged on ever since. While Bolsheviks were signing a treaty with Germany in
Brest-Litovsk, Turks made a pressure on Sejm to proclaim the independence of
Transcaucasia from Russia. Afterwards, simultaneously with other wars Turks were
involved in, prominent three battles for Armenians have happened. The battle of
Bash-Abaran launched on 21th of May and resulted with Turks backing down to
Hamamli on 29th of May. Two other - the battles of Sardarapat and Gharakilisa started
on 22nd and 25th of May respectively. According to the Armenian discourse, the battle of
Sardarapat was a backbone of the establishment First Republic of Armenia and it is a
victory in Sardarapat and Gharakilisa led Turks to leave the territories. Furthermore,
Armenians state that with the victory over Turkey they prevented the complete
destruction of Armenia and Turks’ takeover in Transcaucasia.
Within the framework of Azerbaijani historiography, one of the central historical events
is the liberation of Baku. In the early stages of a new government, the aim of the
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was to liberate Baku from Bolsheviks and Dashnaks.
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Simultaneously, it was impossible to achieve the goal with the military capability of
solely National Government. Azerbaijani representatives, in no time, asked for help
from Turkish government and Nuru Pasha has been sent from Tabriz to Gandja.
Accordingly, in June 1918, two sides signed a treaty on “military assistance and
friendship”, where Turkey marked its military assistance to Azerbaijan. The broke down
of Baku Soviets and their resignation on July opened up an opportunity for
eser-mensheviks and dashnaks to create Central Caspian Dictatorship with inviting
British troops under the leadership of Dunstervill. Due to Azerbaijani historians,
Armenian National Council was very much consonant and waiting for British troops to
arrive in Baku. Attempts of National Government and Caucasian Islamic Army to
liberate Baku has started already on August and on September two-days military
operations kick off resulted with the defeat of Central Caspian Dictatorship and the
victory of Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation. In a sequel, on September 16 the joined
military parade in honour was held.
After independence, Caucasian countries have tackled with a number of disputes
(territorial, demographical) between each other. Azerbaijan reached an agreement with
Georgia and signed several documents with Iran. According to the leader of ADR M.E.
Rasulzade, Azerbaijan built “very friendly relationship with the Democratic Republic of
Georgia - one of our Christian neighbours” (Rasulzadeh 1990: 58). Agreeing on
disputed areas, mutual relations included the joint lobby for being internationally
recognized in the international arena. Hereafter, for promoting economic relations
between France and the republics of Transcaucasia, the France-Caucasus Committee
was established in 1919. The same year became a start point for joined Azerbaijani and
Georgian governments to sign a document with William Chandler US Congressman on
boosting them in the West as well as getting support from the United States
(Shiriyev&Kakachia 2013: 9). Cooperation was expanded in the Paris Peace conference
and a military pact between two countries has been certified. The defensive military
pact presupposed mutual help in case of a military attack against the territorial integrity
(Armenia had also invited to join the pact within two weeks, but the invitation was
refused). Azerbaijan and Georgia could reach the common ground, despite the fact that
in the beginning relations between two were strained and disputes were involved.
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However, the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan remained tough enough and
resolution has not been achieved until nowadays.
A considerable place in Armenian historiography occupies the dispute between Armenia
and Georgia that consequently turned into the war on December 1918. According to
Armenians, during the four-week military conflict, Georgians had a more advantageous
geographic position when the line from Batum was shut off and led Armenians of Tiflis
to be oppressed. The involvement of the British in Batum has thus resolved the violent
relations between two neighbours. Failed to reach an agreement on disputed areas, the
war erupted between Georgia and Armenia. According to Georgian historian, on
December Armenia invaded Borchaly and fortified in some strategically important
places. Janelidze adds that Georgia mobilized its forces, including Azerbaijanis of
Borchaly district who voluntarily joined the Georgian population. The war lasted till
late December and the mutual agreement was reached on November 1919, where sides
decided to resolve disputed areas peacefully.
As it was mentioned before, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic had close ties with the
Ottoman Turkey. Cornell mentions that for him contradictory fact is that in 1918
Turkey recognized the independence of Georgia, but not the independence of
Azerbaijan. This step has been accepted by Azerbaijani leadership frostily, nonetheless
realizing that Turkey is the only option for liberating Baku. Cornell argues that Turkey
did not see Azerbaijan as an independent state, rather as a path for reaching the creation
of Turanian Empire (Cornell 2015: 26). This question still remains questionable within
Azerbaijani historiography as some Azerbaijani historians claim that Turkey, in fact,
recognized newly established Azerbaijani Republic (Hasanli 2009: 81-2).
From the beginning, ADR had strained relations with Russia. The presence of
Bolsheviks and their cooperation with Dashnaks has worsened the situation even more
(Mustafazade 2006: 42). During the 23 months of the existence of the republic, Russia
did not recognize the state as a legitimate government and did not establish diplomatic
relations with the latter as well. Although the relationship between Russia and Armenia
during the First Republic can be described at times ambiguous with their up and downs,
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by and large, there was historically a strong alliance between those two. Russia has been
Armenia’s main protector both against Turkey and existential future of the nation.
Petrosyan outlines that eastern Armenians were sure on Armenia’s unstable
independence and its reunification with Russia. According to him, some of the members
of the parliament did not recognize Armenian independence at all. Petrosyan
exemplifies this with Mamikonyan’s appeal to other members of the parliament: “Is not
the existent of the Armenian Republic a catastrophe?” Nevertheless, in the further
periods, Armenia tried to keep a balance and avoided the closeness with Russia to not to
irritate West on one hand and Turkey on the other. Alike Azerbaijan, Georgia had
complicated relations with both White and Soviet Russians. The clashes between
Georgia and White Russians took place, resulted in the occupation of various Georgian
territories. Nonetheless, due to Janelidze White Russia has failed and later was defeated
by Soviet Russia. After all, Denikin’s White Russia de-facto recognized South
Caucasians’ sovereignties. In spite of Soviet Russia being “hostile” against its southern
neighbour, Georgia had intentions to develop relations with Bolsheviks, but vainly.
Bolsheviks did not recognize Georgian statehood. Furthermore, they restricted the
presence of Georgian representatives in Russia and put in jail Georgian ambassador.
Only in 1920, a peace treaty was achieved by the sides, recognizing the independence of
Georgia. Already at the end of the year, the progress in bilateral relations was noticeable.
Nonetheless, in February 1921, Russia rescinded peace treaty militarily and ceased the
independent statehood of Democratic Republic of Georgia. Two other Caucasian
countries Azerbaijan and Armenia lost their independence in April 1920 and December
1920 respectively.
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4. Analysis
The empirical framework began by describing commemoration patterns in Armenia and
narratives precluded therein. Considering all peculiarities of this case, collected
narratives from current (revolutionary) and former regime’s government-controlled
media outlets as well as Diaspora’s leading media outlets are analyzed. The sub-chapter
that follows moves on to consider the case of Azerbaijan. Differ from two neighbouring
countries, Azerbaijan held two more military parades linking them to the historical past.
On account of pre-mentioned circumstances, both military parade dedicated to the 100th
anniversary of Armed Forces and centennial military parade on the liberation of Baku is
reviewed. In the next sub-chapter, the analysis of narrative and the specificities of
commemoration acts in Georgia will be presented.
4.1 The case of Armenia
In the beginning of 2018, Aram I, Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia announced
2018 as a “Year of Independence” for all Armenians worldwide. Four year ago, in 2015,
Armenians have marked the anniversary of the Armenian genocide/massacre. To mark
this day, almost all Diasporan organizations and the government were involved in order
of remembrance to be memorized all across the world. For this purpose, a state
commission has been created four years earlier in 2011 with the privilege to coordinate
the events dedicated to the 24th of April. Nonetheless, Serj Sargsyan established a state
commission for the celebrating the day of independence only on April, 2017. A
commission should have combined two occasions: centennial anniversary of the First
Republic and the battles of May 1918 (Sardarapat, Bash-Aparan and Gharakilisa).
Prime Minister of Armenia has been appointed responsible for the events and only one
representative of Diaspora, Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), was
included. After a while, under the coordination of the Ministry of Diaspora,
Armenia-Diaspora Forum and Armenian Fund has been asked to get involved.
The celebrations of centennial anniversary of the First Armenian Republic overlapped
with the period of power transition from one political force to another in the aftermath
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of revolution. Starting in the end of March, dozens of Armenians flooded the streets of
Yerevan with the demand of resignation of then newly elected Prime Minister Serj
Sargsyan. He had just served two terms as a president of Armenia and changed the
constitution which would have opened up an opportunity to prolong his term as a Prime
Minister to stay in power. Unexpectedly, the massive protests and civil disobedience
have sparked under the leadership of the opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan. On 23th of
April Serj Sargsyan stepped down and Nikol Pashinyan was sworn in as an Armenian
new Prime Minister.
Before comparing the patterns of narratives of two political forces, one should be
primarily pointed out. By and large, there was no time for the new regime to work on
the alterations of narratives. The commemorations followed the blueprint of previous
regime and just slight changes are noticed in the narratives circulated by Pashinyan’s
government. To the similar conclusions came Armenian experts who shared their
thoughts during the elite-interview. Thereby, Armenian expert Armen Grigoryan stated
that “The commemoration, still following an old script, rather reflected the former
regime’s, mostly the Republican Party’s eclectic ideological approach, with a mixture of
old mythology, Christianity, some memories about the First Republic, Soviet clichés
and so forth. The change of narrative mostly reflected the assessment of the events of
1998-2018, i.e. the period before the revolution”. According to the director of the USC
Institute of Armenian Studies Salpi Ghazarian “The previous regime had planned to
erect the statue of the founder of the First Republic, Aram Manougian. The statue was
erected but by the time it was opened the April 2018 revolution had already taken place.
Under the old regime the house of Aram Manougian had almost been demolished to
free up space for new construction and it had become a point of contention between the
people and the authorities. The new government did not seem to alter anything
significantly, more like let the things ran their course. In a sense, no major revision of
the place of the First Republic in the national consciousness has taken place”.
The day of Independence has been marked at the symbolic Sardarapat memorial with
the key figures of contemporary Armenia. In contrast to two other neighbours, Armenia
presented the anniversary as a day of Republic Day and heroic May battles. All
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narratives along with the official speeches referred to them both. The celebratory speech
of the president Armen Sarkissian stated:
“100 years ago, our people who saw genocide, and stood on the edge of life and death,
restored the independent Armenian statehood with highest effort – declaring the birth of
the First Republic of Armenia. Although it was short-lived and faced numerous
problems, it was the basis for further development of the country’s economy, education,
science and culture, an educated and versed society emerged, which in turn led to new
independence and new victories in 1991. Today we must with special depth realize the
significance of Armenian statehood. As a result of the latest changes in Armenia we
have the chance of a drastic kickoff, and the requires sufficient human and institutional
resources are available. We must unite these efforts, we must act more tactically and
flexibly, because breakthrough moments create the chance to soar.”2
In the fabula the dilemma between the victory and hardship is foregrounded. As it was
mentioned in the theoretical part, a note that has emotional tone is necessary in
implementation of political memory (strengthening self-image, emphasizing on harsh
but achieved goals and triumphs). Herewith, the president outlines that albeit all
hardships tackled, they could achieve the independence and continue to move forward
towards new achievements. In the narrative presented by the president the fact of the
Soviet Union is completely backgrounded. However, there is a gap between the
“restoration of independence” and “new victories”. He does not reckon the period of the
Soviet Union as independent, but simultaneously does not see this period negatively “it
was the basis for further development of the country’s economy, education, science and
culture, an educated and versed society emerged, which in turn led to new
independence”.3 In the end the initial narrative of triumph despite of hardship is
reiterated “breakthrough moments create the chance to soar”.
An equal discourse was followed by Nikol Pashinyan, emphasizing the specific role of
Armenians, the genocide and important wars Armenia went through. For him, there is a
resolution of any Armenian triumphs that should be continued further “we have won
2 ‘We have the chance of drastic kickoff’ - President says on Republic Day (2018, May 28), Armenpress.
Retrieved from https://armenpress.am/eng/news/935164.html
3 Ibid
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and will win in all cases when we decide to win when we put our hope on ourselves and
not on others when we do not give up on any difficulty when we love to love our
homeland and each other when we do not try to tie our narrow personal interests to the
will of our own people and to the state when every citizen realizes that he is the master
in his own country, not the subject, when the feeling of the master is not only the right
but also the duty, whenever we look at every corner of the homeland with the hate,
another with respect, patience and dignity”.4 This is a telling example of the political
memory, where the political lider again stresses the strenght of the nation, its capacity
and endurance to overcome and “will win in all cases when we decide to win”.
Analyzing the whole narrative provided by the Prime Minister, the ordering processes
and plot are noteworthy to mention. The beginning of the narrative outlines the
emergence of the First Republic, battles, genocide, and people who played role in
triumphs. The middle of the narrative gives an overview on the resolution of the victory,
the similarities between Armenia hundred ago and now. Whereas, the end of the
narrative concentrated on the contemporary Armenia and the view of the Armenian
future. In his speech, he lately touches upon the Soviet Union, where he asserts the
importance of both republics ”It was thanks to the existence of the First Republic that
Armenia was incorporated into the Soviet Union as a full-fledged republic. And it was
only thanks to this status that Armenia was able to get out of the USSR and get the
status of internationally recognized independent country”.5 Similarly to Armen
Sarkissian’s narrative the Soviet Union is depicted rather positive. In the fabula,
Armenian people (including historical figures) and Turkey are foregrounded, in contrast,
Russia and other actors are backgrounded.6
By and large, even though majority of narratives of both regimes are overlapping, there
are still some minor differences. For instance, in the aftermath of Pashinyan’s
celebratory speech, the (spokesperson) member of Republican Party of Armenia Eduard
Sharmazanov has criticized the president’s appeal.7 The issue was that the president
4 “Century of Victory” in Sardarapat (2018, May 28), Armenians Today. Retrieved from
http://hayernaysor.am/en/archives/283635
5 Ibid
6 “Century of Victory” in Sardarapat (2018, May 28), Armenians Today. Retrieved from
http://hayernaysor.am/en/archives/283635
7 Garegina Nzhde ne upomyanuli (2018, May 30), Golos Armenii. Retrieved from
http://www.golosarmenii.am/article/66981/garegina-nzhde-ne-upomyanuli
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Pashinyan in his speech has not touched upon Garegin Nzhdeh, a person presented by
RPA as one of the main heroes of Armenia (earlier the previous regime erected a
monument in his honour). Second, in contrast to the new regime, the previous regime
has made considerable emphasis on the battle of Sardarapat. Indeed, the battle is
included to absolutely all narratives presented by both sides, however, the repetition of
the battle separately demonstrates its special place within the former regime’s narrative.
By and large, there is a strong cohesion between two narratives regarding Turkey. Both
of them depicts Turkey as an occupant and an existential threat to the Armenian
republic. Nevertheless, in the fabula the invasion of Red Amy and Bolshevik takeover is
backgrounded. There is a positive and/or neutral depiction of Russia in the narratives.
Both regimes emphasize on the Russian participation in the military parade alongside
Armenian soldiers in Sardarapat. The relation with two neighbours is in general
downplayed as well (Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is usually mentioned referring to the
Third Republic, but also foregrounded). However, in one of the publications about the
First Republic, Iravunk elaborates both Armenian-Georgian and Armenian-Azerbaijani
then-territorial conflicts. Additionally to the Georgian narrative and historical
background presented, Iravunk mentions that in September 1920 when the new
Armenian-Turkish war has sparked, Georgians seized that opportunity and “captured
not only the neutral zone, but also some populated areas in Lori and Javakhk”
(Armenians call the region of Samtskhe-Javakheti - “Javakhk”). Concerning Azerbaijan,
the narrative covers territorial disputes over Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhchivan, but says
nothing on events happened in Baku (for example, in the end of March). Nevertheless,
the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan exist in most of Armenian narratives. Iran
is usually backgrounded, however, the previous regime describes Iran as a country with
which Armenia did not have territorial disputes, rather had trade and diplomatic
relations.8
To get a local opinion on this issue, respondents shared their views on the perception of
regional powers and how has their image been changed since independence. According
to Salpi Ghazarian “Russia has been perceived as the historical ally sharing with
8 Armenia otmechaet 100-letiye Pervoy Respubliki (2018, May 28), Iravunk. Retrieved from
https://www.iravunk.com/ru/news/8529
37
Armenia two centuries of fraternal relations spanning the imperial, Soviet and the
modern-independent periods. Iran had historically entered the national consciousness as
the foreign invader and the overlord that had ruled over Armenian territories for
centuries. However, since independence, Iran has emerged as Armenia’s solid ally in a
volatile region and during the early years of independence at times was Armenia’s sole
connection to the outside world due to the blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan
and the civil war in Georgia. Unlike Turkey, Iran did not play the religion card and
remained a neutral neighbor. Turkey has been viewed as the power that committed a
great crime against the Armenians in the form of the genocide and that looms over the
national perception. During the initial years of the independence, there was a moment
where the perceptions could have changed by the opening of the border but the
subsequent blockade imposed on Armenia by Turkey extinguished that possibility. The
attitudes differ in Armenia and in diaspora. The diaspora often sees Turkey as the
unapologetic criminal (although that’s changing now and coming closer to the Armenia
attitude, where there are also the views that Turkey is also the regional neighbor and a
change of attitudes and relations could be beneficial for Armenia”.
In addition to Salpi Ghazarian, Armen Grigoryan adds that “Since the early 1990s, Iran
established friendly relations with newly independent Armenia, and the perception has
been influenced by that relationship. Older grievances related to the former Persian rule
are not significant. Russia’s perception was not so positive during the struggle for
independence and in the early 1990s but then changed with the ‘strategic partnership’
narrative and a partial revival of the Soviet narrative about Armenia being exposed to an
existential threat and needing Russian support. There is a pro-Western segment of the
society which views Russia less favourably, as a threat and an impediment to trade and
cooperation, particularly after the pressure by Russia in order to abandon the EU
association agreement in 2013. Currently, the likely approach is more or less: not
getting Moscow strongly annoyed and just waiting until it faces an internal crisis, like
the USSR did, in order to achieve a higher level of independence. The image of Turkey
as an existential threat, sustained in the Soviet period, was challenged in the early 1990s.
Since 1998, the change of political situation, including a growth of significance of the
Dashnaktsutyun party, resulted in a revival of the older narratives, although paired with
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rhetoric about border opening. Then, Serzh Sargsyan’s ‘football diplomacy’ with
Turkey in 2008-2009 briefly reinforced the rhetoric about developing relations without
focussing much on the past, but Sargsyan’s main interest in the process was probably
international legitimisation of his regime after the contested presidential elections in
2008.”
Meanwhile, the First Republic looms large over the Diasporan consciousness. The
centennial anniversary was widely celebrated in Diaspora with dozens of events and
academic conferences which shed light into the legacy of the First Republic. First and
foremost narrative that considerably emphasized in the Diasporan discourse is
Armenian genocide/massacre. It can be reckoned as a central narrative with the decisive
role of victories in Sardarapat, Bash-Aparan and Gharakilisa over Turks.
Notwithstanding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is always backgrounded in Diasporan
narratives, where the main emphasis is given to the genocide and relations with Turkey.
However, there is also division of opinions within Diaspora about the period
1918-1920.9 As I have mentioned before, the dominant force in Armenia at that time
was Dashnaksutyun party. But in Diaspora there were two other parties which had to
some extent different approach to the First Republic: Social Democrat Hunchakian
Party and Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (Ramkavar). Two parties were a part of
“coalition” opposed to Dashnaks’ political symbolism and were favourable towards the
Soviet Union. They avoided any public activities with the symbols of the First Republic
and did not mark the 28th of May annually. The First Republic were usually associated
and called “Dashnak Republic” (widely used in the Soviet Union as well). Under these
circumstances, the main common factor was Armenian genocide/massacre. Thus, “elite
settlement” happened when all three parties decided to unify against Turkey. The
dispute over the First Republic is important, because it finds the reflection in the
narratives provided by sides.
In the online media outlet of Ramkavar Armenian Mirror-Spectator, these parallels can
be explicitly seen: “The victory at Sardarapat belongs to all Armenians as well as to the
9 Centennial minus one (2017, May 28), EVN Report. Retrieved from
https://www.evnreport.com/politics/centennial-minus-one
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fledgling republic, which was born from the blood and sweat of heroes”.10 Above, the
point is meant that the victory and the Republic itself is not only a merit of Dashnaks.
The same discourse comes next: “For a long time, Dro and Aram Manoukian had been
depicted as the only true heroes of the battle, sometimes overshadowing the professional
military, who were the real architects of the victory, because those military leaders did
not have political heirs. Today, they are all on a pedestal for the entire Armenian nation.
They were the ones who collectively fought without distinction, saved a piece of
historic land from calamity and created an ancestral homeland for posterity”.11 The
division of opinions over the Soviet Union comes up with the outlining that “For a long
time, there was also historic injustice when comparing and contrasting the first
independent republic to the Soviet-era republic. As we revisit historic facts without
prejudices and biases, we realize the three republics complement each other in unity. As
much as the Soviet-era leaders are maligned as corrupt communists, many of them
harbored true patriotism and nationalism in their hearts to generate pride in the battle of
Sardarapat and inspire respect for our martyrs”.12 Thereby, the narrative of Ramkavar
party included only the negative image of Turkey, positive image of the Soviet Union
backgrounded, whereas do not mentioning either two neighbours or other actors.
Asbarez and Armenian Weekly media outlets, in contrast, belong to the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation. Comparing to all general Armenian narratives, both of them
give more attention to the role of Church. The fabula of the Church narrative
foregrounds the role of Turkey and their survival “A century ago, our people were on
the verge of life and death. Ottoman Turkey, taking advantage of the confusion of
World War I, carried out its Armenian Genocide program. Western Armenia and
Armenian settlements were ruined in Turkey, the Turkish troops even entered Eastern
Armenia, thus threatening the existence of our people” and downplays the
Motherland-Diaspora relations and the army.13 Moreover, Diasporan narratives focus
on the centennial anniversary of US-Armenia relations, which in fact is often absent in
10 The Battle of Sardarapat and its Aftermath (2018, May 24), The Armenian Mirror-Spectator. Retrieved
from https://mirrorspectator.com/2018/05/24/the-battle-of-sardarapat-and-its-aftermath/
11 Ibid
12 The Battle of Sardarapat and its Aftermath (2018, May 24), The Armenian Mirror-Spectator. Retrieved
from https://mirrorspectator.com/2018/05/24/the-battle-of-sardarapat-and-its-aftermath/
13 Karekin II Issues Encyclical on 100th Anniversary of Armenian Independence (2018, February 8),
Asbarez. Retrieved from
http://asbarez.com/170326/karekin-ii-issues-encyclical-on-100th-anniversary-of-armenian-independence/
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the inter-Armenia narratives.14 However, even though, in general, Russia is portrayed
neutrally. Some of the narratives contain Russia being depicted as an occupant “When
the abrupt, but not unexpected, end of the First Republic came amid its occupation by
the Russian army, not all Armenians viewed that event with trepidation. Admirers of the
Bolsheviks were pleased. Others firmly believed that being part of the Soviet system
would provide Armenians with the security and respite they needed—especially, as it
seemed, with an unrepentant and resurgent Turkey as a neighbour. Yet, there were also
those who held that the end of the First Republic was an irreconcilable loss, and that
there could be no justification that would allow the ARF to accommodate the existence
of a Sovietized Armenia”.15 According to the latter “In the interim 70 years during
which Armenia had no independent voice, the ARF was an effective proponent for
Armenian issues, for a free and independent Armenia, and for the development of
Armenian-centric communities”.16 The narrative also does not contain any information
on two neighbours of Armenia and only mentions Iran as a country where majority of
survivors lived in.
Last but not least, there is a thought circulated that is noteworthy to mention. Director of
the USC Institute of Armenian Studies Salpi Ghazarian point out that “most of the
centenary celebrations took place in the diaspora where those are still nostalgic affairs
of the glory of 1918. In Armenia, the role of the First Republic or its centenary played a
not-more-than-a-symbolic role. More and more however, there is a call to learn from the
mistakes of those years”. The overlapping narrative appears in the Diaspora “Just a few
days ago, the Centennial of the first Armenian Republic, the first Armenian state in 543
years, was grandly celebrated right where its founding was secured, at Sardarabad,
along with Gharakiliseh and Bash Aparan… supposedly. Based on people’s accounts,
while pomp and circumstance abounded, they was somewhat misdirected. Music –
mostly Russian, with the focus not on 1918 but Armenian achievements during WWII
14 The Centennial of the First Republic and a Century of U.S-Armenia Relations to be Celebrated in D.C
(2018, May 26), The Armenian Weekly. Retrieved from
https://armenianweekly.com/2018/05/26/the-centennial-of-the-first-republic-and-a-century-of-u-s-armeni
a-relations-to-be-celebrated-in-d-c/
15 The ARF Response to the Demise of the First Republic (2018, May 26), The Armenian Weekly.
Retrieved from
https://armenianweekly.com/2018/05/26/the-arf-response-to-the-demise-of-the-first-republic/
16 Ibid
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and the Artzakh liberation struggle”.17 Then, it is mentioned that “It seems that the
allergies certain sectors of Armenian society have to the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation render it more important to disrespect and denigrate the 1918 republic, given
the two are inextricably intertwined. Never mind that its birth was the highest
expression of Armenians’ will to survive, come together, fend off the attacking
Ittihadists-cum-Kemalists, and start building the state which served as the basis for what
we have today”18. According to the thought, the centennial celebration did not recognize
the role of Armenian Revolutionary Federation in formation of the First Republic, but
rather had merely a symbolic role where only Nikol Pashinyan asserted the importance
of First Republic and ARF.
4.2 The case of Azerbaijan
The president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev declared 2018 as a “Year of the Azerbaijan
Democratic Republic”. Similarly to the first case, the president issued a decree “On the
100th anniversary of the Azerbaijani People’s Republic” only in May 2017. The
coordination of the occasion was given to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and from
over 200 suggestions, 100 events have been approved. Beside domestic celebration, a
new website devoted to the centennial anniversary planned to be created and
international events are regulated. Oppositional groups, on the contrary, asserted that
little attention has been paid to the overall celebrations and the First Republic.
According to the oppositional figures, current government see as a father of the nation
the former president of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev and oversees the importance of
founding fathers and the First Republic. Coupled with government-funded projects,
Baku welcomed a march (with the government permission) dedicated to the centennial
anniversary initiated by civil society activists and members of oppositional party ReAL.
On 28th of May, the president Ilham Aliyev has attended an official reception on the
occasion of centennial anniversary, where he made a speech to mark the 100th year of
17 Centennial Lookalike (2018, June 4), Asbarez. Retrieved from
http://asbarez.com/172519/centennial-lookalike/
18 Ibid
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independence. By and large, the narrative of the president has not concentrated merely
on the First Republic but also the Third Republic until nowadays. “The establishment of
the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic is a historic event. A democratic republic was
created for the first time in the Muslim world. We are rightfully proud of the fact that
the Azerbaijani people created this republic. This shows again that the Azerbaijani
people are a great, freedom-loving and progressive people. The Azerbaijani state has
great respect for the memory of the founders of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic”,
says Ilham Aliyev specifically pointing out Azerbaijan being the first democratic
republic in the Muslim world. Making a bridge between the First and Third Republics,
the president characterizes Azerbaijanis as “great, freedom-loving and progressive”.19
Then he continues “I want to say again that we are rightfully proud of this historic event.
The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic existed for 23 months but managed to do a lot
during this time. The state flag of Azerbaijan was established, citizenship of Azerbaijan
was established, our national army was established. Next month, we will celebrate the
100th anniversary of our army. In September 1918, the national army of Azerbaijan,
together with the Islamic Army of the Caucasus, liberated Baku from the occupation of
Armenian-Bolshevik detachments and returned our ancient city of Baku to the
Azerbaijani people. The Democratic Republic created a border detachment. The
historical name of Ganja was returned to this city. More than 200 laws were adopted in
a short time. A special place among them, of course, is held by the law on granting
women the right to vote. Baku State University was established, and this shows that the
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic intended to do a great deal of work in terms of training
national personnel and developing education. Our native Azerbaijani language was
adopted in all educational institutions.”20
The achievements of the First Republic are highlighted and the repetition of “proud of
this historic event” contributes an emotional tone to the overall narrative. Lately, the
main “Other” according to Ilham Aliyev’s narrative comes up “liberated Baku from the
19 President Ilham Aliyev attended official reception on centennial of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
(2018, May 28), Azertag. Retrieved from
https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President_Ilham_Aliyev_attended_official_reception_on_centennial_of_Azerb
aijan_Democratic_Republic_VIDEO-1167079
20 Ibid
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occupation of Armenian-Bolshevik detachments”. Here, the victory with the liberation
of Baku is foregrounded, but occasions such as March Days are backgrounded. The
beginning of the plot is telling about the importance of the First Republic and success of
the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in realization of its policy. In the middle, the
president gives a general outlook on the Azerbaijan after restoration of the
independence and the role of Heydar Aliyev in the future of the country. The end of the
plot narrates on the accomplishment of Azerbaijan at the current stage, steps and
success in international arena. Here, he also denotes Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and
how the army has developed since the war has erupted.
Differ from both Armenia and Georgia, Azerbaijani president does not mention why
particularly the ADR fell after 23 months. For instance, “The Democratic Republic
sought to create a strong state so that the Azerbaijani people could live in the conditions
of freedom and calm. Unfortunately, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic did not exist
for long – the republic fell after 23 months. This is a great tragedy for us. I am
absolutely sure that if independence had not been lost in 1920, Azerbaijan could be
among the richest and most developed countries of the world now, because our natural
resources and geographical location enabled us to effectively use these natural
resources”, “Unfortunately, we lost our independence. This shows again that it is more
difficult to preserve independence than to gain it. The flag raised in 1918 was lowered
in 1920, but it was raised again by great leader Heydar Aliyev at a session of the
Nakhchivan Supreme Majlis 70 years later”.21 In all three mentioned times, nothing is
told about the reason behind the fall of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. What is
more, the whole narratives kept largely silent about the Soviet Union, more precisely,
the period Azerbaijan has been incorporated to the Soviet empire. This gap is notably
visible here “This shows again that it is more difficult to preserve independence than to
gain it. The flag raised in 1918 was lowered in 1920, but it was raised again by great
leader Heydar Aliyev at a session of the Nakhchivan Supreme Majlis 70 years later”,22
where the Soviet Union is downplayed. However, even if the silence of this period
21 President Ilham Aliyev attended official reception on centennial of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
(2018, May 28), Azertag. Retrieved from
https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President_Ilham_Aliyev_attended_official_reception_on_centennial_of_Azerb
aijan_Democratic_Republic_VIDEO-1167079
22 Ibid
44
exists, the president implicitly demonstrates Azerbaijan was under the Soviet
occupation. Further, he shows more explicit the Soviets as “Other”, - “Immediately after
the bloody January tragedy, on 21 January 1990 [Azerbaijanis commemorate Black
January annually], he went to the permanent representative office of Azerbaijan in
Moscow and condemned the Communist Party for the crime it had committed”. At the
end of the speech, the president elaborates pre-mentioned standpoint asserting that
“Despite all these resources [natural resources are meant], Azerbaijan was the most
backward republic of the Soviet Union before Heydar Aliyev came to the leadership of
the republic in 1969. Why? Because we were not independent! They were not masters
of our own destiny”.23
Media narratives put an emphasis on Azerbaijan being the first secular and democratic
republic in the Muslim world. The image of Turkey is portrayed fairly positive, where
due to media narrative, then-Azerbaijani government approached Turkish authorities
with a plea for aid and joined Azerbaijani-Turkish troops several times got the victory.
The narrative depicts the treaty between Turkey and Azerbaijan, however, does not give
any information on the historically debatable topic on Ottoman Turkey’s
(un)recognition of Azerbaijan. In contrast, Russia’s image varies from relatively neutral
to often negative. Over this time, media landscape was predominantly narrating the
strategically important geographic place of Azerbaijan and natural resources of Baku as
a reason to “become the main target of the Soviet Russia” in the Caucasus. In the
mid-April, the Red Army entered the northern borders of Azerbaijan and shortly
occupied Baku. What is interesting, in the near past two consecutive years, state-run
media landscape carried on a strong negative view of Russia. The news-story is called
“Harsh moments of history: if not the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic…” and focused
on Russia’s role in Azerbaijan’s history. “In 1918, after more than 100 years of South
Caucasus being occupied by Russians, the Azerbaijani nation could restore its
statehood”, “New generation of occupants - bolsheviks did not have any choice, but to
tolerate with the historical fact”, writes an author, pointing out that there were positive
23 President Ilham Aliyev attended official reception on centennial of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
(2018, May 28), Azertag. Retrieved from
https://azertag.az/en/xeber/President_Ilham_Aliyev_attended_official_reception_on_centennial_of_Azerb
aijan_Democratic_Republic_VIDEO-1167079
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relations between medieval Azerbaijanis states and their northern neighbour [Russia],
however the deterioration has come with the expansionist policy of Russian Empire”.24
A narrative set off from the deep historical background of the relationship; the path of
remaining under the Russian occupation and forceful inclusion into the Soviet Union.
Other than that, a story has been written in Russian intended for both Russian speakers
within the country and international audience. The last four-five years, the emotional
tone of narratives comparatively melted down, yet still either neutrally or negatively
portraying the Russian image. Mutual parallels have been drown by Azerbaijan and the
USA. Azerbaijani narratives outline the role of Wilson (relations with the delegation of
Azerbaijan, coupled with the democratic credentials given by then-US side) and Paris
Peace Conference. Same narrative appears in the statement issued by the US embassy,
pointing out that “delegates left a lasting impression on American President Woodrow
Wilson.”, having values close to Wilson’s own.25 The statement gives attention of the
founding document that guaranteed rights to all citizens, regardless of differences
(religion, ethnic origin, gender and class).
On account of Baku-based expert, who said, on the condition of anonymity, “De-jure
depiction of the regional powers has never been radically negative in the official
narratives, albeit small-scale displeasures between Azerbaijan and each of these powers.
Whereas, in general, there is usually the negative view of Russia (due to historical
patterns such as Russian traces in Black January Massacre (1990) and Khojaly
Genocide (1992), support to Armenia in the context of NK conflict). Whereas, both
official and society narrative towards Turkey is quite positively ideological and
ideologically positive due to ethnic and cultural kinship, as well as due to Turkey’s role
in the promotion of Azerbaijan’s recognition and sovereignty and in supporting the
latter’s territorial integrity. Less has been changed in the memories of entire society
regarding the attitudes of all regional powers, as their foreign policies attitudes (which
24 Povorotnye momenty istorii: Esli by ne Azerbaydzhanskaya Demokraticheskaya Respublika (2015,
May 28), 1news az. Retrieved from
http://www.1news.az/news/povorotnye-momenty-istorii-esli-by-ne-azerbaydzhanskaya-demokraticheskay
a-respublika
25 Azerbaijan Democratic Republic 100 Years Later: Our History, Looking to the future (2018, May 22),
Official website of the US embassy in Azerbaijan. Retrieved from
https://az.usembassy.gov/the-azerbaijan-democratic-republic-100-years-later-celebrating-our-history-look
ing-to-the-future-william-r-gill-charge-daffaires/
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ultimately generates a public reaction in Azerbaijan) have not been changed either”. As
argued by another interviewee Lala Aliyeva, “The centenary anniversary of ADR had
much of an impact on the Azerbaijani government. Specifically, they were cautious on
the possibility of march devoted to the 100th anniversary to be expanded into the large
scale protests (at the same time, it became a reason of elections being held before the
occasion)”.
Yet, there is a riveting account of Britain and Israel in official narratives. Referring back
to background information, the relationship between ADR and Britain has been
relatively dubious. Notwithstanding, state-run media outlets devoted news on Britain,
especially British writer published a book on the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic.
Conducting the interview with the writer, the media outlet enquired the relations
between Britain and Azerbaijan as well as the role of Dunsterville and Thomson therein.
Owing to Graeme Wilson “Britain’s involvement in Azerbaijan was, at best, calamitous.
General Lionel Dunsterville strikes me a buffoon and his intrusion into this story, the
defence of Baku, with capitalist Britain allying itself with the Soviet-Dashnak
administration, cost thousands of lives in prolonging the nation’s struggle for
independence. Dunsterville’s diaries make interesting reading as he repeatedly, and with
great frustration, refers to the cowardice of the Dashnaks. By contrast, I find the
personal journey of Lieutenant General Sir William Thomson quite illuminating. He
entered Baku at the head of an occupying force and was belligerent toward the
government of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. However, as he grasped the
prevailing circumstances, he became supportive. His relationship with the Azerbaijani
government matured quickly to become benevolent and productive”.26 Media outlets
also refer to the London Post, publishing the reportage on the Azerbaijan Democratic
Republic, yet do not bring up Azerbaijani-British relations “Significance of Azerbaijan
26 Graham Wilson tells about the history of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2018, May 30), 1news az.
Retrieved from
http://www.1news.az/news/graham-wilson-tells-about-his-fascination-about-the-history-of-azerbaijan-de
mocratic-republic
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Democratic Republic (ADR), which existed only almost two years, will live on
forever”.2728
Due to the narrative “The first state that recognized the independence of ADR was the
Ottoman Empire and legal basis of relations between these countries was laid by the
Treaty of Batum which was signed on June 4, 1918” and “Iran became the first country
that de jure recognized the ADR on March 20, 1920”, all the same, “Only recognition
by the Great Powers could help to fully rebuff the existing threats: aggression of
Denikin’s army and Soviet Russia, etc”.29 Much like Armenia and Georgia, the
Azerbaijani narrative put an emphasis of the Soviet Union making the First Republic
forgotten “For a very long period of time, the history and legacy of the Azerbaijan
Democratic Republic were among the forbidden, almost taboo topics. Many
representatives of the Republic were “forgotten” on purpose by the Soviet
government”.30 Concerning Georgia, the narratives dwell on first democratically
elected Muslim Woman - Peri-khan Sofieva, who was ethnically Azerbaijani from
predominantly Azerbaijani populated village of Georgia.31 The general Azerbaijani
narrative also contains the positive Other - Israel. Media outlets highlights “the
brotherly relations between Azerbaijan and Israel”, meetings of Jewish, Christian and
congressional leaders on the occasion of the 100th anniversary with Azerbaijani officials,
the devoted reportages of Israeli broadcasting as well as reports in “The Jerusalem Post”.
It is mentioned that in the newly established secular and democratic republic there were
three Jewish ministers (the minister of health, deputy-minister of finance and minister of
religious affairs) in Azerbaijani government.
27 5 fact about Azerbaijan Democratic Republic - First Western Democracy of the Muslim World (2018,
May 27), The London Post. Retrieved from
https://thelondonpost.net/5-facts-azerbaijan-democratic-republic-first-western-democracy-muslim-world/
28 5 fact about Azerbaijan Democratic Republic highlighted in the London Post (2018, May 28), Trend
news agency. Retrieved from https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2909357.html
29 Ibid
30 5 fact about Azerbaijan Democratic Republic - First Western Democracy of the Muslim World (2018,
May 27), The London Post. Retrieved from
https://thelondonpost.net/5-facts-azerbaijan-democratic-republic-first-western-democracy-muslim-world/
31 The world’s first democratically elected Muslim Woman was from Azerbaijani village of Georgia
(2018, March 9), 1news az. Retrieved from
http://www.1news.az/news/the-world-s-first-democratically-elected-muslim-woman-was-from-azerbaijan
i-village-of-georgia-photos
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In 2018 centennial anniversary of two more events have been marked on a large scale
within Azerbaijan. First, a military parade dedicated to the centenary anniversary of the
Armed Forces of Azerbaijan has been held at the Azadlig (Freedom) Square on June 26.
Over 4000 servicemen took part in the military parade and more than 240military
equipment and 70 aviation assets have been presented therein. Moreover, up to 100
servicemen from Turkey, Israel, Georgia, Belarus, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Bahrain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia joined the
centennial military parade.32 It is stated in one of the narratives “Despite that
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, established on May 28, 1918, existed only 23 months,
it did a lot in a short period of time. The country started the creation of the national
army, understanding that its own armed forces were needed to protect the achievements
of the young republic. At the same time, the situation in the region was extremely tense.
The neighbouring countries were openly expressing their plans to partition the
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and take away its territories. Azerbaijan achieved
significant results in creating its own armed forces in a short period of time. The created
army repeatedly and successfully beat off the aggressive attacks of the Armenian
militarists”.33 Here, in the fabula, the enemy through the “Armenian militarists” is
foregrounded, whereas remained negative actors are downplayed “the neighboring
countries were openly expressing their plans to partition the Azerbaijan Democratic
Republic and take away its territories”.34 In the narratives presented both on a
centennial military parade and joined Azerbaijani-Turkish parade, there is always a
bridge built between the narratives of the First Republic and Azerbaijan restored its
independence. Therefore, the emphasis on victory presented above is linked this the
contemporary Azerbaijan “The April fights are our glorious victory. The Azerbaijani
soldiers, officers, generals, the Azerbaijani army showed real heroism, professionalism
and valor”.35
32 A military dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the armed forces of Azerbaijan to hold (2018, June 25),
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Retrieved from
https://mod.gov.az/en/news/a-military-parade-dedicated-to-the-100th-anniversary-of-the-armed-forces-of-
azerbaijan-to-hold-23189.html
33 Azerbaijan marks centenary of Armed Forces (2018, June 26), Trend News Agency. Retrieved from
https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2920941.html
34 Ibid
35 President Aliyev: April battles dispelled myth created by Armenia about its army (2018, June 26),
Trend News Agency. Retrieved from https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2921520.html
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Second, in September 2018 both Azerbaijan and Turkey celebrated, as Azerbaijani
media landscape puts it, the date which is one of the symbols of Azerbaijani-Turkish
friendship and brotherhood. In honour of this date, the military parade has been held
with the joined Azerbaijani-Turkish military troop and participation of the president
Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Owing to the narrative, there were several
potential occupants to resist - “Armenian dashnaks, Bolsheviks, eser-Mensheviks and
English invaders”. On the contrary, the saver in that situation was Turkey. The ordering
process starts with the 1905-1906 and the narrative covers March Days, the historical
developments took place until the victory of sides. In the fabula, Armenians (Dashnaks
and Bolsheviks) are foregrounded, however, Britain is downplayed. Moreover, the story
gives information on active communication between Stepan Shaumian and Moscow.
The language of the narrative has a strong emotional tone, stressing on the mutual glory
and pride.
4.3. The case of Georgia
2018 was announced by the president Margvelashvili as a year of freedom. The
reception has been held at the Presidential palace accompanied with the exhibition on
the 100th anniversary dubbed symbolically “From Independence to Freedom”. The
speech was given reviewing the past year and touching upon some remarkable points on
the importance of centenary anniversary: “As soon as they were given the opportunity,
they established the republic, the state based on European standards. Georgia was one
among ten countries in which elections were held by universal suffrage and gender
equality was promote. Our ancestors protected these values hundred years ago. We have
founded independent judiciary and National Bank and established all those high
standards that at that time have been controversial even in Europe: abolition of death
penalty, prisoners' rights and other human rights.”36
One of the central points of the Georgian narrative is an aspect of Europe and being
European. The statement makes an emphasis on the advanced features of the newly
36 President Margvelashvili Declares 2018 Year of Freedom (2017, December 19), Official web site of
the President of Georgia. Retrieved from
https://www.president.gov.ge/en-US/pressamsakhuri/siakhleebi/saqartvelos-prezidentma-2018-celi-tavisu
flebis-cla.aspx
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established republic “based on European standards” with feeling of pride and honour,
standards that “have been controversial even in Europe”. Simultaneously, considering
themselves as a part of Europe, but also not enough European (“even in Europe”).
Margvelashvili continuances, however, that “These years are followed by 70 years of
occupation; our exhibition clearly shows that Georgia has never been entirely conquered
because there were people who defended the idea of independent Georgia through own
personal heroism and dedication under the extreme conditions in the totalitarian state”.37
The fact of the occupation is highlighted, but in the fabula the information of who
occupied is backgrounded twice (“70 years of occupation” and “totalitarian state”).
Furthermore, the president concludes his speech with pointing out the direction of
Georgia “Our goal is to transform independence to freedom”, which looks not at past
(independence), but freedom (future). Moreover, there is a point directly related to
collective memory. In his statement, the president appeals as “we have founded”,
however meaning the First Republic. This is what, according to Assmann, the cohesion
and collective memory. When those who have not experienced and witnessed the events,
talk from the first person as they did.
Throughout the year there were various events devoted to the 100th anniversary of
Independence of Georgia. Nonetheless, the majority of them took place only at the end
of May closer to the day of independence. With the initiative of the Naming and
Symbolic Commission of Tbilisi Sakrebulo (City Assembly) has been decided to
rename the Rose square into the First Republic square. The decision was not welcomed
by the National Movement and European Georgia parties due to the obvious reasons as
their participation in the Rose revolution and acceptance of this step as an erasure of the
part of Georgian history. Quite symbolic and significant in terms of influencing the
society was a theatrical show of historical reenactment of the proclamation of
independence. Even more allusive is that the occasion has been performed at the
National Youth and Children’s palace (crucial for memory politics) and at the same
local time when the independence had been announced. The narrator describes the first
37 Ibid
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republic as the “newly born state as a democratic republic, its neutrality in international
conflicts and aspiration for friendly relations to all countries”.38
During a week of independence dressed in costumes, Georgian artists facilitated an
artificial flashback by moving back to 1918-1921 and demonstrated historical figures
with scenes for their visitors. Several cafes and avenue have been turned into historical
areas; it was possible to send anniversary postcards and take the sight on a 1920s market
with an exhibition. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry held an exhibition regarding
Georgia’s diplomatic history.39 Similar event has been held in different regions and
cities across Georgia. The government of Georgia launched a new project “Revive
History”, where the main actors and historical figures (Noe Jordania, Noe Ramishvili,
Ekvtime Takaishvili, Giorgi Kvinitadze, Akaki Chkhenkeli, Maro Makashvili, Christine
Sharashenidze, Zakaria Paliashvili, Sandro Akhmeteli, and Ivane Javakhishvili) were
deeply introduced to the population via created profiles on Facebook.40 Moreover, for
the same purpose, specific microfilms have been prepared and presented by the First
Channel.41 These are appropriate indicators of cultural and political memory: they
spread out the narratives which re(construct) the collective/national memory and
influence the national identity. Both cultural and political memory used in the
ceremonies facilitates these narrative to circulate and be transformed from one
generation to the other.
The same found its reflection in the answers of the respondent which pointed out the
peculiar role of the cultural and political memory in the resurgence of the First Republic.
For instance, according to Senior Fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and
International Studies Giorgi Badridze “In Soviet times the memory of the First Republic
38 Century-old proclamationofGeorgia’s independence reenacted inTbilisi (2018,May 26), AgendaGe.
Retrieved fromhttp://agenda.ge/en/news/2018/1136
39 Findhighlight events celebratingGeorgia’s FirstDemocraticRepublic centennial (2018, May 22), AgendaGe.
Retrieved from http://agenda.ge/en/news/2018/1089
40 Historical figures fromGeorgia’s FirstDemocraticRepublic unveiledonFacebook (2018, May 14), AgendaGe.
Retrieved fromhttp://agenda.ge/en/news/2018/1030
41 Saqartvelos Demokratuli Respublikis 100 wlis iubile (2018, April 26), First Channel, Georgian Public
Broadcaster. Retrieved from
https://1tv.ge/show/saqartvelos-demokratiuli-respublikis-100-wlis-iubile/?tab=video&video_category=0
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was deliberately erased, or at best ridiculed. Since the late 1980-s it gained huge
importance in the public life – its symbols (flag, anthem, maps) were eagerly used as the
symbols of the national independence movement. However, the society was split in
their appraisal of how well the leaders (Social Democrats) used the historic
opportunity to rebuild the statehood that was lost 100years before, and whether they
did everything they could to stop the Bolshevik invasion in 1921. In any case, 1918
republic is viewed as the main source of legitimacy of the current republic”. Due to the
second respondent Zviad Abashidze, the First Republic had “only on very minor
[impact] of the population [national consciousness], especially only on those who had
some personal contacts with political of cultural elites by those times. The popularity of
the first republic is coming mostly from the construction process of political institutions
and establishments education and culture.”
In addition, new armed forces recruits arrived in Tbilisi from six distinct regions for the
oath-taking ceremony at the Freedom Square. Joining the ceremony, prime-minister
Kvirikashvili particularly outlined the role of the First Republic on the fate of Georgia,
“May 26 a hundred years ago was exactly this kind of day for Georgia. That day was the
result of logical development of the nation’s history, eternal national energy and great
efforts of many generations. I cannot but recall the historic role of the national liberation
movement of the 60s in the 19th century. Georgian political and legal reasoning was
step-by-step forwarding towards the establishment of the Georgian state. If not the
people who laid the foundation for Georgia’s independence, if not the notable Georgian
figures, if not the special role of the Georgian Church, if not the unified national
consciousness, there would not be 26 May 1918 and or present Georgia”.42 This
example is sufficient enough to demonstrate the plot of the narrative with explicit
causes and effects. The process sets off with the national liberation movement and lasts
till nowadays. Starting with this particular period, “people who laid the foundation”,
“Georgian figures”, “Georgian Church”, “unified national consciousness” make the
existence of contemporary Georgia possible. In the fabula the question of politics is
totally background: there is no information on what political circumstances led to the
42 Giorgi Kvirikashvili - I am sure oath took 100 years ago will fulfilled (2018, May 26), First Channel,
Georgian Public Broadcaster. Retrieved from
https://1tv.ge/en/news/giorgi-kvirikashvili-sure-oath-took-100-years-ago-will-fulfilled/
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existence and the end of the First Republic, however, the peculiar role of the Georgian
people is foregrounded.
By and large, the analysis of the state-run online media outlets’ shows that the occasion
of the 100th anniversary of the First Republic is highly de-politicized. In all three
websites, there are no full-fledged narratives: only declarative statements, weakly
narratives or texts with narratives elements which were in fact analyzed further.
Although the narrator is considered as the journalist, the focalizor has remained the state
(which perspective is dominant). The central narrative in the majority of media
narratives is the factor of Europe, referring directly to focalizor. As a whole, the
language of the narratives (of media itself) are formal and lack of emotions. The next
narrative that displays the link between being European and the 100th anniversary of
statehood is the speech given by the president of the European days in Tbilisi:
“There are two very important moments in European civilization – individualism and
freedom to maintain this individualism in the whole society. We are the part of this
culture naturally and I congratulate all those free people who are toiling selflessly for
free Georgia, free Europe and Georgia to become the part of this Europe. European
countries are providing serious support for Georgia. This support will be even more
clear on May 26, when we together with our European like-minders will celebrate the
first 100th anniversary of the First Republic of Georgia”43
Notable that individualism and freedom have been chosen as two very important
moments, but even more notable is the year is being called by one (Freedom) of these
important moments, where the statement illustrates the reunification of Georgia with the
naturally associated European civilization. Thus, the road from independence to
freedom is the indicator of Georgia’s reintegration with its roots. Same is applicable to
the other similar narrative which was referred on the opening of the Arch of 26 May and
quoted from the Justice House’s press-release, “The arch which is installed at the
entrance of the Justice House is a symbol of the road that Georgia has passed over a
43 Giorgi Margvelashvili - Europe will strengthened Georgia joins European Union (2018, May 5), First
Channel, Georgian Public Broadcaster. Retrieved from
https://1tv.ge/en/news/giorgi-margvelashvili-europe-will-strengthened-georgia-joins-european-union/
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century to return to Europe. Citizens of Georgia who come to take a modern biometric
passport will have to symbolically pass through the same road, which Georgia has
passed since 1918”.44
The statement explicitly confirms previous thought on the road from the independence
to freedom that “Georgia has passed over a century to return to Europe”. The similar
narrative comes up from the conducted interview with Giorgi Badridze who points out
that “In Georgia, the main lesson of the restoration of independence both in 1918 and
1991 is that Georgians choose to try to build a European type of state with strong
pro-Western/European aspirations. This suggests that “Return to European family” is
not a tactical choice of a particular political group in just one historical moment but a
will of the Georgian people that any government would have to respect”. Identical
patterns are seen in the response of Zviad Abashidze as well “In Georgia in most of the
cases, the historical narrations are strongly concerned with the West and European
culture. There are only a few exceptions among the elites, who are hoping on Russian
orientation, but among the public, the position is highly discredited”.
Nonetheless, in the contemporary official narratives not only Europe is significantly
depicted, but also the United States of America. In 2018, Georgia held the symbolic
conference “US – Georgia Strategic Partnership Conference ”, emphasizing on the
historical relations between those two. “We have survived so much to arrive here today
and, of course, the Georgian people are the heroes of this story. 100 years ago this
month, Georgia took a leap into the future. We gave birth to the Democratic Republic of
Georgia, as turmoil, revolution, and civil war swirled around our small country,
powered by forces much larger than ourselves. Our predecessors may or may not have
realized at that exciting moment that Georgia’s independence—our freedom—would be
delayed still further, for nearly two-thirds of a century more. The Red Army swept into
44 100 years of historyofGeorgian passports showed in new Arch of 26 May (2018, May 263),
AgendaGe. Retrieved from http://agenda.ge/en/news/2018/1094
55
Georgia just three years after we reclaimed our statehood, and, at least temporarily,
swept our independence away”.45
Here, the same parallels in narratives occur, where the occupant is given (Red Army),
but the actor of who is the occupant is backgrounded. “But we have been good and
persistent stewards of our dream of independence and freedom. A century ago, Georgia
set its course inseparably with the West. Georgia is not a between-land. Our culture is
European with strong American accents; our outlook is Western and transatlantic, as are
our values and politics... We are proud and active member of the transatlantic
community, and will only grow more so over time. The United States was among the
first to recognise Georgia’s independence in 1991. America supported us when we most
needed it - during some of the most trying episodes of our own national consolidation.
Georgia is honoured to be one of America’s strategic partners”.46
Further, prime-minister highlights Georgia’s choice on the Western direction “our
culture is European with strong American accent”. The repetition of “We” is equally
observed therein, where the concept of collective memory comes up. In the fabula,
Kvirikashvili used “Georgia is not a between-land”, where Georgian direct path is
foregrounded, and its neighbours one of which tries to keep a balance, and the other stay
neutral is backgrounded. Concerning the overall narratives with the historical parallels,
there were no narratives containing the information on historical relations with almost
any of neighbours. Turkey (or Ottomans) is totally hidden from the context, Russia is
implicitly foregrounded as an occupant (Russian Red Army, Soviet invasion) without a
direct quote. The relations between Armenia and Georgia are presented as historical, but
no details are given.4748 Same can be said for the relations with Azerbaijan, where the
45 Georgia PM opens US-Georgia Strategic Partnership Conference (2018, May 23), Agenda Ge.
Retrieved from http://agenda.ge/en/news/2018/1101
46 Ibid
47 Nikol Pashinyan - Armenian-Georgian relations have historic and human grounds (2018, May 30),
First Channel, Georgian Public Broadcaster. Retrieved from
https://1tv.ge/en/news/nikol-pashinyan-armenian-georgian-relations-historic-human-grounds/
48 Giorgi Kvirikashvili - Armenians are actively involved in country’s building (2018, May 30), First
Channel, Georgian Public Broadcaster. Retrieved from
https://1tv.ge/en/news/giorgi-kvirikashvili-armenians-actively-involved-countrys-building/
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reportage displays historical relations without mentioning any details, e.g. mutual
signed military pact, with concentration only on contemporary period.49
To get a broad insight, the question on how the regional powers are perceived according
to Georgian national master narratives and whether their images have been changed
since independence (and the Soviet Union) was asked. As states by Zviad Abashidze
“Since the Soviet Union, the image of Turkey and Iran developed to better side in spite
of tough historical memory. Russians are strongly presented as occupants. In certain
circumstances, Iran and Turkey bear also the image of historical occupants and enemies,
but mostly they are presented as economic (both) and strategic (Turkey) partners”. The
answer very well fits into the general theory: albeit of the harsh collective memory, the
relations are presented positively according to the contemporary foreign policy
orientation.
Giorgi Badridze, having a similar standpoint, elaborates this thought separately by
powers “The absolute majority views Russia negatively. Such feelings are reinforced by
the realities of post-independence relations with Russia: Russian support for separatists
from the very beginning, their participation in the wars in the early 1990-s which
resulted in the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Georgians, war 2008 and
ongoing occupation of 20% of Georgia’s territory etc”. According to Badridze, “Iran
will always be viewed with caution” and “Attitudes toward Turkey are varying: most
people understand the benefits of the political and economic partnership (Turkey is N1
trade partner), however, there are forces who are trying to disturb old wounds and often
spread pure fake news about Turkey’s intentions vis-a-vis Georgia: for years
pro-Russian sources claim that in 2021 the Kars Agreement defining Turco-Georgian
border will expire and that Turkey will annex Adjaria”. Noteworthy to outline that these
replies give a general overview on the situation in Georgia, not precisely how it is
portrayed in the state-run journalism. It describes the actions of the state in general, but
not how the relation has been reflected in the media narratives.
Nevertheless, there is another view on why the government treats the memories of First
Republic cautiously. As specified by historians specialized in studying the First
49 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of Azerbaijan (2018, May 28), Ajara Ge. Retrieved from
http://ajaratv.ge/news/en/29258/100-anniversary-of-the-people'.html.html
57
Republic of Georgia, the reason is laid in the rulers being social-democrats and the
history deliberately hidden during the Soviet Union. Stephen Jones mentions that since
independence quite usually the First Republic was accepted just like socialists, the term
which had a negative linkage with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, under the Zviad
Gamsakhurdia there was a complete rejection of socialism, and therefore the First
Republic (even the constitution). Later, the constitution has been restored, however, the
attitude still remained negative. Jones argues that under Saakashvili the First Republic
was criticized and only now the situation starts to slightly change.50
50 Q and A: Why are Georgians still suspicious of the First Republic? (2018, July 21), Civil Ge.
Retrieved from https://civil.ge/archives/246979
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Findings and Concluding Remarks
Through this thesis, I set out to comprehend the dynamics of memory politics and
commemoration in three countries of the South Caucasus, whether these patterns can
alter the narratives originally written by historians. Thus, one of my objectives was to
outline the historical background information and analyze the narratives circulated
mostly in May 2018. I sought to examine the ways how the contemporary centennial
narratives from the state-run media outlets have been changed in contrast to historical
narratives according to the existent political situation within countries.
In order to shed lights on the research question proposed, I utilized a set of theoretical
frameworks and narratives that are ultimately interconnected; involving national,
cultural and political memory, the triangle of memory-identity-interest and their impact
on the foreign policy, and therefore on the construction of future narratives, as well as a
notion of journalism anniversary usually dubbed as public historians. The
elite-interview with the 2 local expertise (expert and academician) from each country
are conducted to get a local view on the patters gained.
The importance of memory occurs in the overall celebrations of the centennial
anniversary. In the South Caucasus, the day of independence has been marked in a wide
range, including military parades, theatrical scenes, concerts, museums and so forth.
People who have not witnessed individually and lived in the First Republic,
unconsciously identifying themselves with the part of history, being a constructed “We”.
The day of remembrance, therefore, boosted solidarity and contributed to the identity
and nation-building process. A whole process is facilitated by states adding a symbolic
spirit via military parades (and the story on the background), theatrical scenes at the
same place and the same time (thus, making an artificial flashback back to hundred
years ago), patriotic concerts and museums. Both political and cultural memory used in
three states opened up a window of opportunities to fortify newly produced memories
through the generations. And what is important here is the participation of people in the
acts of commemoration.
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The past and current interaction between states contribute to the identities of states. And
identities which are a composition of values, practices, and ideas have been built based
on peculiar memories. As it was mentioned in the theoretical background
collective/national memories are interconnected with the collective/national identities.
Whereas there is an interdependence between the collective/national memory and
political/national interest, according to the social constructivism, the collective/national
identity, in contrast, has an impact on political/national interest. In a sequel, the
political/national interest influence the foreign policy, making it possible to narratives
being shaped by the current situation. For instance, in the case of Azerbaijan, the
negative perception of Russia is a chance for the government to alter narratives with
time (more highlight and present in a more mild way). It can be seen in the current
narratives portraying neutrally negative and in 2014, 2015 (during the strained relations
betweem two) with a strong negative tone against Russia. Moreover, in addition to the
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, part of the narratives outline the role of the former
president Heydar Aliyev in the Third Republic. Nevertheless, the political equilibrium
relatively exists, owing to awareness of the government on the special place of
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in Azerbaijani national consciousness. It opened up an
opportunity for getting a wider sympathy from considerable part of society pursuing the
founders of ADR as an idol and an inspiration.
The contradictions between political interest and national interest shape how historical
events are represented. Quite telling is a Georgian case, where previous regimes due to
their perception and view of the system treated the First Republic. For example,
Gamsakhurdia’s rejection of socialism, and past comparison of the First Republic with
socialism led to complete refuse of the memory of the republic. Under Shevarnadze the
attitude remained relatively negative, whereas Saakashvili at all criticized the Georgian
Democratic Republic. Only afterwards, the shift has occurred in general narratives in a
more positive way. In case of Armenia, the interest has been reflected in the
representation heroes as Garegin Nzhdeh in the previous regime and being completely
overseen in post-revolutionary Armenia. The clash of interests influenced the memory
construction of Diasporan Armenians as well. According to distinct parties, for some,
60
the First Republic is an inspiration and the proud of the party (Dashnaksutyun), whereas
for others it is merely an indicator of independence overseeing the ruling party.
Since one of the objectives was to compare the history with the current narratives, it
provided knowledge of which particular event is either highlighted or concealed. From
the broad historical literature, only the attitude towards the main actors and occasions
(to which historical attention is mostly paid) of that period were chosen. Accordingly,
the history of Armenia and Georgia portrayed Turkey as an occupant and an essential
existential threat to the newly established republics. Differ from them, historians of
Azerbaijani studies estimated the relationship diversely: mostly Azerbaijani historians
stressed on a positive historical image of Turkey, whereas other historians assessed the
relation as dubious (the issue of recognition of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic or the
cooperation between two sides).
Albeit of particular difficulties in Armenian-Russian relationship, Russia is depicted as
a strong and inevitable ally of Armenia and a crucial force against Ottoman Turkey.
Though in a more mild way than Turkey, Russia still is presented negatively in
Georgian historiography. Tough relations between two, only melted down relatively at
the end of the existence of the First Republic of Georgia until the Bolsheviks have
occupied the former. In Azerbaijani historiography, Russia’s image had strong negative
emphasis (bolshevik-dashnak cooperation, unrecognition, and occupation by both White
Russia and Bolsheviks). In all three countries, Iran is described in a relatively neutral
way. Germany occupies one of the central places in historical narratives of Georgia as a
saver and facilitator of gaining independence, staying neutral towards Britain. Yet,
Britain is reckoned by Armenian historians as a country which helped the new state.
Azerbaijan delineates Britain rather ambiguous: notably negative in the early stages of
the republic and relatively positive in the end.
By examining the implications of the subtext of background information, it became
evident that contemporary centennial narratives are shaped by political circumstances.
The image of Turkey in the contemporary state-run media landscape’s narratives in
Armenia is substantially negative. What is more, the narratives foreground the three
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battles more than the Democratic Republic of Armenia, because battles led to the
emergence of the republic. Turkey’s image, however, is completely hidden (though
Turkey was the main “Other”) from the state-controlled media what is understandable in
contemporary bilateral strategic relations between Georgia and Turkey. The narratives
of Azerbaijani media towards Turkey are estimated as highly emotional and positive,
emphasizing on kinship and victories gained together. Nevertheless, according to the
existent positive relationship between two political forces, the narrative was highlighted
more with the holding a military parade in honour of the common victory. Armenia’s
state-run media does not portray Russia as an occupant, rather narrates on the
incorporation of Armenia into the Soviet Union which, due to both officials and media,
contributes to the restoration of independence in the early 90s. Georgia’s
state-controlled media is quite cautious in depicting Russia. Although the narratives, in
general, are relatively neutral, Russia in anyway is implicitly portrayed as occupant and
the Soviet Union as a period of occupation. Even though the last couple of years
Russia’s image melted down in Azerbaijan’s government-controlled, it still remains
negative. The Soviet Union is either ignored or described as an occupation and a
forceful inclusion therein. What is interesting, Russian troops participated in Armenian
and Azerbaijani military parades. Nevertheless, when Armenia dedicated several
separate storylines (previous and current regime) to their participation, Azerbaijan
mentioned it merely in the line with different countries’ troops took part herein. Britain
is backgrounded in Armenia’s and Georgia’s narratives, but highlighted in Azerbaijani -
and can be assessed more positive than negative.
Diasporan Armenians in contrast to Armenians living in Armenia foregrounds the
historical relationship between the USA and Armenia, whereas in Armenia’s narrative
the USA is downplayed. Notwithstanding, Armenia’s narratives outlines the help of
Americans in the early stages of the First Republic. The peculiar role of the USA is
included both in Georgian and Azerbaijani as well. All three narratives try to build a
bridge and draw apparent parallels between the current situation. Despite the historical
relationship between Georgia and Germany, the media also comparatively downplays
Germany. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan highlights the friendship and build a bridge between
Israel and Azerbaijan, and Jews living in Azerbaijan back to 1918-1920 and the First
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Republic. The Armenian-Georgian war is downplayed in both countries’ narratives as
well as the cooperation of Azerbaijan and Georgia. The territorial disputes are
highlighted in both Armenia and Azerbaijan; in addition, media outlets of Azerbaijan
put a crucial emphasis on liberation of Baku from Dashnaks and Bolsheviks, but
Armenian media landscape does not touch upon either the liberation of Baku or March
Days.
By and large, all three countries stress on gaining independence, but also restoration of
statehood. This narrative is more obvious in case of Armenia, in almost all narratives of
which Armenia restored its statehood is highlighted. Self-image has been explicitly
strengthening in all countries of the regions, but the overall view was different. For
instance, Armenia focuses on the past: achieved victories and importance of past
experiences. Azerbaijan dwells on the present, underlining the developed army (with
three military parades) and improvements. Georgia prioritizes the future (a year “from
independence to freedom”) and nearest reunification with Europe. Notions as glory,
pride, victimization, and trauma are part of all national narratives of these states.
Armenia, meanwhile, narrates on the significance of democratic values of the First
Republic, while Diasporan Armenians put a great emphasis on the overall celebration of
the republic. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia westernize the politics of memory, outlining
gender equality (first democratically elected woman in Georgia and first in
Turkic/Islamic equal woman rights in Azerbaijan).
In conclusion, the expectations made in the introduction have been proved and the
research question answered. The memory of the First Republics have considerable
impact on countries’ national consciousness (despite the Soviet Union has been trying
to erase this period). Thus, the remembrance is highly immersed into the national
consciousness of Azerbaijanis and Diasporan Armenians. Its is relatively high in
Georgia and less important in Armenia. According to findings, albeit of having a similar
history, all countries of the South Caucasus shift their narratives owing to political
situations in a different way. Nonetheless, the political situation included the structure
of memory-identity-interest (and foreign policy orientation), which, in a sequel,
facilitated the process of shaping historical narratives.
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Limitations
During the research, there were a couple of limitations and challenges I tackled with.
Firstly, there was no chance to be a witness of the centennial celebrations as a
participant to dig into the atmosphere. Secondly, an important limitation was the
language barrier. For instance, in the case of Georgia, where the government of Georgia
created specific projects on Facebook and Public Broadcaster with videos (for domestic
audience), but in Georgian. Hence, it was the main reason for taking the international
direction in analyzing the narratives.
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Appendix: Interview questions
Central/Research question: How were the historical narratives about centenary
anniversaries in the South Caucasus shaped by political situations?
Subsidiary questions:
Question 1: By and large, what role does the First Republic play in
Armenian/Azerbaijani/Georgian national consciousness? (strong, weak or maybe
population does not perceive the First Republic as the successor of independent
statehood)
1a: Are there any differences in perceiving the First Republic between Armenia and
Armenian diaspora?
Question 2: How do you assess the significance of centenary anniversary
commemoration on Armenia/Azerbaijan/Georgia’s nation-building process?
Question 3: How did domestic situation and the interest of the political regime reflect
the representation of centenary anniversary commemoration (its celebration, narratives,
etc)? 3a: Specifically, in the aftermath of revolution, how were the historical narratives
articulated by previous regime altered under Nikol Pashinyan?
Question 5: Currently, Georgia keeps strong pro-West orientation, Armenia tries to
preserve a balance between Russia and the West, whereas Azerbaijan maintains the
position of neutrality in its foreign policy orientation. Does the same parallels occur in
narratives about centenary anniversary presented by elites? Which historical events do
elites consequently highlight more and what do they try to conceal?
Question 6: How are the regional powers (Russia, Turkey, Iran) perceived according to
Armenian/Azerbaijani/Georgian national master narratives? Has their image in the
country’s collective/national memory been changed since the independence (or the
Soviet Union)?
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